


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2 JANUARY 1990



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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 9, September 1989

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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology

No 9, September 1989

Economic Cooperation: We Must Take Action Instead of Waiting!

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[Article by Viktor Borisovich Spandaryan, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies; response to A.V. Kunitsyn's article "The New Thinking in Soviet-American Economic Cooperation," SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA*, 1988, No 12; words in boldface as published]

[Text] A.V. Kunitsyn was right when he spoke of the need for a realistic theory of Soviet-American economic relations, based on an objective scientific analysis of the situation. There is nothing fundamentally incorrect in the author's comments on the prerequisites for the development of these relations, but should practical steps be postponed until we have completed the perestroika of the national economy and foreign economic operations, accumulated foreign currency resources, and established the ideal conditions for activity by Soviet organizations and foreign firms? I think they should not. We should take action now. For this reason, concrete action to revive Soviet-American economic relations **under the actual conditions of the present day** is just as important, in our opinion, as the analysis of this matter. It is not just the new thinking we need in this area, one of the most stagnant areas of Soviet-American relations; we also need a new pragmatic approach, which will allow us to establish normal conditions by taking **concrete action** to develop trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

Problems, Difficulties, and Barriers

This will be a difficult task because when we look back into history, we see that economic contacts have not been an important part of the total set of Soviet-American relations except during a few brief periods (the pre-war years, World War II, and the first half of the 1970's). In this field we do not have any strong traditions or any experience in protracted interaction.

In the first half of the 1970's, as we know, legal agreements laid a broad basis for the comprehensive development of Soviet-American trade and economic, scientific, and technical cooperation (the trade agreement calling for mutual most-favored-nation treatment, the agreement on mutual credits and financial procedure, the agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, and several others). An inter-governmental Soviet-American Commission on Trade and the U.S./USSR Trade and Economic Council (SovTec) were established.

These new possibilities, however, were never used. Anti-Soviet groups in the United States halted the operation of the mechanism of legal agreements for the development of trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union (the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments). The entry of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and the events in Poland severely aggravated Soviet-American relations, and this was reflected specifically in the variety of economic sanctions and embargoes Washington instituted at the beginning of the 1980's.

Even in this atmosphere, however, business groups wanting economic contact with the USSR exerted pressure on the U.S. administration and forced it to reconsider some earlier decisions (the lifting of the "grain embargo" and the ban on shipments of oil and gas equipment to the USSR). The administration did not support a single one of the congressional right wing's attempts to institute even more stringent conditions in trade with the USSR and encouraged the intelligent application of anti-dumping legislation to shipments of Soviet carbamide (in exchange for American superphosphates). A statement about the compulsory (although with several provisos) fulfillment of earlier contracts in spite of new restrictions and bans was added to the legislation on the administration's export controls. All of this testifies that even the existence of local economic interest in certain sectors of American business will motivate the U.S. administration to take a more balanced position.

The overall improvement in Soviet-American relations as a result of the series of summit meetings and the important agreements concluded in the military-strategic, political, and humanitarian spheres has recently created a new and more favorable atmosphere for the development of economic relations between the two countries. Joint statements on the results of these meetings have invariably underscored the firm intention to expand mutually beneficial trade and economic contacts between the USSR and the United States. The perestroika in our country, particularly the economic reform and the reform of foreign economic activity, is playing a positive role. Although American attitudes toward perestroika are not unanimous, we feel that more and more people in the United States are beginning to believe that, in the words of the authors of a report by a research group from the Institute for East-West Security Research, the interests of the United States and the rest of the world will be served best by an economically healthy and stable Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there have been no significant advances in the development of trade and economic relations yet.

The current situation is one in which economic contacts between the USSR and the United States are in a state of decline and stagnation despite the progress in many important spheres of bilateral relations. This is attested to by an analysis of data on Soviet-American trade in recent years.

USSR Trade with United States, in millions of rubles

Categories	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Exports	305.9	326.1	312.5	279.0	331.5
Imports	2829.0	2377.0	1146.0	919.4	1772.6
Total	3134.9	2703.1	1458.5	1198.4	2104.1

"Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1987 g. Statisticheskiy sbornik" [USSR Foreign Trade in 1987. Statistical Handbook], Moscow, 1988; VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1989, No 3.

As we can see from the table, commodity turnover was 2.6 times as great in 1984 as in 1987. Furthermore, this was not the result of grain imports: Figures excluding grain imports were 1.3 billion rubles in 1985, 1.1 billion in 1986, and 800 million in 1987. In 1988 the volume of total reciprocal shipments increased slightly, primarily because of the growth of Soviet imports, but it did not even reach the 1984 figure.

The trade assortment is extremely limited, consisting of only a few commodity groups. These are chemical products (ammonia and others), energy resources (oil and coal), fur, and vodka on our side and grain, chemicals, and some kinds of equipment on the American side. Even this limited assortment, however, is not distinguished by stability.

The instructions issued by the leaders of both countries to the appropriate ministries and departments in December 1987 and approved in May 1988, to draw up recommendations of specific ways of expanding mutually beneficial trade and economic contacts, including contacts based on the long-range agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation (which was renewed), were essentially never carried out.

What is impeding the development of Soviet-American economic contacts today?

First of all, the historically determined, lengthy economic separation of the USSR and United States, the weakening of commercial ties in recent years and even their severance in some areas, and the negligible volume and limited assortment of reciprocal shipments have led to a situation in which both countries are accustomed to getting along without one another.

Second, the continued absence of a solid foundation of legal agreements (most-favored-nation status and an official trade agreement) and the mutual doubts about the viability of trade and economic ties due to the unpredictable actions of the U.S. administration and Congress have made these contacts unappealing and sporadic and have undermined trust in their stability and promise. These doubts still exist today.

Third, the limited nature of the USSR's export resources and the low competitive potential of many Soviet products, especially machines, technical equipment, and finished goods in general, have reduced opportunities to penetrate the American market. This, in turn, has impeded our imports of U.S. goods. Furthermore, the

fact that a high percentage of the currency we earn from sales of energy resources to West European countries has to be used to pay for imports of grain from the United States limits our ability to develop economic ties with other industrially developed capitalist countries expressing an interest in the development of trade with the USSR.

Fourth, the declining competitive potential of many types of American goods and the continued ban on exports of state-of-the-art technology to the USSR have reduced the interest of our organizations in imports from the United States.

Fifth, the awkward bureaucratic system that dominated our foreign economic operations until recently, the isolation of our industrial enterprises from the foreign market, and their lack of incentive to export goods diminished the interest of dynamic American business groups in commercial cooperation with the USSR. The foreign economic reform should correct the situation, but this is a slow and somewhat inconsistent process and it has not led to any significant advances yet.

How Can the Deadlock Be Broken?

We must not think that these obstacles are insurmountable. In the United States the improvement of Soviet-American relations has led to stronger demands for the normalization of economic contacts with the USSR; the competitive potential of many American products is being restored (in connection with the devaluation of the dollar and with technological innovations); Soviet organizations have been increasingly active. The economic reform is gradually augmenting export potential and making several Soviet goods more competitive.

The agreement of 31 May 1988 on the basic principles of cooperation by the Soviet Foreign Economic Consortium (SVK) and American Trade Consortium (ATC) began to be carried out when they concluded a general trade agreement on 30 March 1989 to lay a legal foundation for several joint ventures on Soviet territory with the participation of the American corporations making up the ATC—Chevron, Archer-Daniels-Midland, Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, RJR/Nabisco, and Mercator—and Soviet SVK enterprises, ministries, and departments. Now it is important to ensure that these joint ventures in such fields as medicine, public health care, the food industry, light industry, machine building, and instrument building begin their operations as quickly as possible.

All of this suggests that Soviet-American economic relations can be developed in the presence of political will and purposeful action on both sides.

On the political level, this will require efforts to carry out the instructions of the leaders of both countries on the drafting of specific proposals for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. Little has been done in this area to date, and we must admit that this is partly a result of passivity on the Soviet side.

The legal mechanism created in the first half of the 1970's must be set in motion. The first step here should be the unconditional granting of most-favored-nation status to the USSR. The proposals now being made in the United States with regard to the temporary suspension of the Jackson-Vanik amendment are not a fundamental solution to the problem. There must be strong guarantees on the level of government trade policy rather than temporary and conditional concessions. We cannot agree with the American opinion (which is also the opinion of some people in our country) that the cancellation of restrictions and bans on trade with the USSR will not do much for the development of economic relations. This is not a matter of quantities, but of principle. We also, however, cannot agree with the other extreme point of view and make everything conditional upon the repeal of prohibitive amendments. After all, even at a time of U.S. restrictions on trade with the USSR, there are broad opportunities for cooperation in agribusiness, light industry, the tourist industry, etc.

It would probably be best to revise, by mutual consent, the status of the USSR Trade Representation in the United States, which does not have the right to engage in commercial operations at this time, and to add the position of trade attache to the staff of our consulates in New York and San Francisco or open branches of the trade representation there.

Amtorg operations should be more active, and the work of the USSR Purchasing Commission in the United States should be revived.

On the practical level, there must be much more vigorous contact between business groups in the two countries (the exchange of delegations, the organization of seminars and exhibits, the exchange of economic, commercial, and legal information, etc.). It will be necessary to revive the work (and productivity) of SovTec and the intergovernmental commission on trade and not confine their activity to annual meetings and sessions. It will be necessary to promote the investigation and planning of new forms of economic contacts (joint ventures and industrial and scientific-technical cooperatives). Cooperation between the Soviet and American consortiums should produce concrete results more quickly. The basis of Soviet-American trade and economic cooperation should be expanded through the more active inclusion of small and mid-sized American firms.

Economic contacts with individual American states, particularly on the West Coast, could be an important

element of the development of trade and the future augmentation of the export potential of the Soviet Far East and the creation of joint enterprise zones there.

The work style of our associations, enterprises, and organizations operating in the U.S. market must be changed radically. The prolonged and sluggish examination of specific proposals, the bureaucratic obstacles, the confusion resulting from the inadequate preparation of Soviet organizations for operations in the foreign market, and their frequently incompetent actions there have done much to disillusion the American business community. Former Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige once said that "many projects are discussed, but less than 5 percent are recorded in contracts."

We must not confine our relations with the United States to the sphere of military-strategic, political, and humanitarian issues, however significant these might be. We need a scientifically sound, long-range theory of the development of Soviet-American economic relations as the material basis for the consolidation of progress in all other spheres. This theory should reflect the profound structural changes in the economies of both countries, the tendency toward the intensification of world economic contacts, the changes in the world economy as a result of scientific and technical progress, and the potential opportunities offered by the continued reduction of arms and military budgets and the conversion of some military production units.

The Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies could make a substantial contribution to the elaboration of this theory. We must not proceed from the fairly common pessimistic assessments of future Soviet-American economic relations. Instead, we should promote the investigation of real possibilities in this area. We must proceed from the belief that the normalization and expansion of bilateral economic contacts will be important not only in strengthening relations between the USSR and the United States in general, but also in the extensive development of trade and economic cooperation between the East and the West and in solving several acute international problems and strengthening international economic security. Finally, without the normalization of economic relations with the United States, it would be difficult to hope for membership in the GATT and other international economic organizations.

Questions connected with Soviet-American trade and economic relations have been discussed widely in the United States for many years by influential members of the business community, the scientific community, Congress, and the administration. Many of the discussions were initiated by the American Committee of U.S.-Soviet Relations (formerly the American Committee on East-West Accord), an independent non-partisan research organization founded in 1974.

The point of view of the influential American businessmen interested in trade with the USSR (the executives of the well-known Dresser Industries, Caterpillar

Tractor, PepsiCo, Control Data, Owens-Illinois, and other companies), in a nutshell, is that the U.S. administration's attempts to attain political goals in relations with the USSR with the aid of various sanctions, embargoes, and restrictive trade legislation only injured American business and American workers. Trade bans cannot change Soviet policy—foreign or domestic.

Using his experience in trade with the USSR as a guide, prominent American businessman D. Kendall issued this "appeal" from the business community to the makers of U.S. foreign policy:

Separate trade policy from foreign policy;

Put an end to restrictions on the trade in non-strategic goods;

Settle the matter of granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status exclusively on the basis of economic considerations;

Extend Export-Import Bank credits to the USSR for the purchase of American goods.

He also stressed that the inviolability of contracts must be observed and that the unpredictable behavior of the American administration in trade with the USSR must be stopped. Besides this, in the words of Congressman D. Bonker (Democrat, Washington), many influential members of the administration and Congress are inclined to give ideological considerations precedence over economic factors in their decisions on Soviet-American trade relations and are likely to take actions intensifying confrontation even during periods of reduced tension.

Many participants in the sociopolitical debates believe that the elaboration of a precise trade policy in relations with the USSR is being impeded by the lack of agreement between individual government agencies, and even by the competition between them—the State Department, the Department of Commerce, and the Defense Department—and also by the absence of firm political leadership by the President in this area.

Under the conditions of glasnost, it would probably be best for us to also conduct broad and open discussions of problems in Soviet-American economic relations on the level of the general public, with the participation of representatives of scientific research institutes, economic organizations, and sectorial ministries and departments, and not allow policy in this important sphere to be wholly under the control of a small group of officials, even if they are the most highly qualified officials. A correct and farsighted policy in this sphere could have a perceptible effect on the entire spectrum of Soviet-American relations.

The establishment of the new thinking in international relations, the constructive foreign policy of our country, and the apparent positive changes in Soviet-American relations will inevitably diminish the effects of ideological and military-strategic factors on present and future economic considerations. As normal conditions are

established for the development of Soviet-American economic relations, more attention will have to be paid to such practical matters as the appropriate legal basis, the competitive potential of goods for reciprocal deliveries, the level of customs duties and other fees and taxes, the development of an infrastructure for the unimpeded completion of commercial operations, credit and investment possibilities, the encouragement of joint ventures, modern communications, a simpler system of reciprocal visits, advertising, maintenance services, shipping potential, etc. We must start thinking about these (and taking action!) now, laying a foundation in advance for the future development of trade and economic cooperation.

Of course, we must not overestimate possibilities in Soviet-American economic contacts, at least in the foreseeable future. It is clear that the main area of our trade and economic cooperation with the West will continue to be Western Europe and the Pacific Asian countries. More vigorous Soviet-American economic contacts, however, will put us in a stronger and more advantageous position. We should also remember that in the more distant future, when the perestroika of the Soviet economy and foreign economic operations produces the anticipated results, the American market might be extremely important to us, and economic, scientific, and technical exchanges with the United States will be an important element of our interrelations with this country. The preparations for this, however, must start today.

Recent events attest to definite advances in Soviet-American economic relations.

Judging by articles in the press and the reports of participants, the 12th annual meeting of SovTec in the United States was successful and aroused great interest in broad segments of the American business community. According to U.S. Secretary of Commerce R. Mosbacher, who addressed the gathering, the present administration hopes to develop Soviet-American trade and economic relations and intends to remove the restrictive statements from the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

New agreements on cooperation, particularly in biotechnology, were concluded at the time of the SovTec meeting. A joint consortium was established for the production of medicine and medical equipment in the USSR. Arrangements were made for a U.S. national trade exposition in Moscow in fall 1989.

In his message to the 12th annual SovTec meeting, M.S. Gorbachev advocated the development of Soviet-American economic ties on a scale befitting our two great states and favored the establishment of an economic foundation for political dialogue between the USSR and the United States.

The history of Soviet-American relations testifies that this will not be an easy task. It is obvious, however, that

the political, military- strategic, cultural, and humanitarian relations between our countries will be stronger if they have a stable and broad material foundation.

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Washington, Paris, and European Security

904K0001B Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 17 Aug 89) pp 12-21

[Article by Viktor Sergeyevich Mikheyev, candidate of juridical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] France's unique status in the North Atlantic alliance, a nuclear strategy differing radically from the American one, and Paris' hope of strengthening its own position on the European continent by reducing the influence of both "superpowers" are the reasons for the complexity of its partnership with the United States. The conflicts which once had sensational overtones, however, occasionally obscured another side of the American-French partnership—the close social and politico-military cooperation by the two countries within the Atlantic framework. This has always served as the basis for the improvement of bilateral relations, even during the periods of extreme tension under de Gaulle and G. Pompidou. As long as the factors which gave birth to the Atlantic system exist, it will continue to exist and to have a serious effect on the entire situation in Europe. Of course, this does not mean that the role of these factors has remained unchanged. The relative decline of their significance is the reason for the stronger centrifugal tendencies in the Atlantic system.

The United States and France represent the two extremes in the Western camp—Atlanticism and Europeanism. The United States' attempts to dominate the Atlantic camp and France's desire for independence, combined with each side's hope for stronger allegiance from its allies, come into conflict. To expand French (and West European) independence, Paris will have to change the very system of Atlanticism and the system of European security, and it has been striving to make these changes for three decades now. These issues are the subject matter of this article.

Gaullism and Atlanticism

European security is one of the deep-seated problems in American-French relations. It has two facets. The first is the degree of the West European "power center's" autonomy in relation to the United States. The second is the European area of East-West relations, the balance of power in Europe.

Oddly enough, it was France that was one of the main initiators of the North Atlantic Treaty, the cornerstone of the Atlantic system, after World War II. It had its own

reasons, of course, for doing this. The shock of the defeat of 1940, the radical change in the traditional, centuries-old balance of power in Europe, the establishment of a socialist regime in the Eastern European countries, and the increasing activity of leftist forces in Western Europe, especially in France itself (Communists were part of the government until 1947), were the main factors promoting the right wing's "Atlantic" initiative. Furthermore, people in Paris, and in the West in general, were less afraid of a direct military invasion from the east (especially since few believed this could happen after the Americans had the monopoly on the atomic bomb) than of the rapid spread of socialism's political influence. The fierce image of the Stalinist regime, the frighteningly repressive nature of which was associated in the West European mind with unpredictable foreign policy actions, also played a part in the decision of France and of Western Europe as a whole to form a politico-military alliance with the United States.

When this historic postwar transatlantic bargain was struck with the United States in the security sphere, however, Western Europe, and especially France, apparently did not realize the full implications of the deal. After granting the Old World its politico-military guarantees, primarily nuclear, the United States initiated the creation of a centralized military organization not envisaged in the treaty—the NATO Integrated Military Command—under its own control (the war in Korea was the catalyst) soon after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, which turned 40 this year. The mechanism of the IMC gave the United States the leverage for politico-military dominion in the Atlantic system.

Whereas France's neighbors submissively accepted the unprecedented change in Europe's traditional politico-military principles, Paris began resisting this move even before de Gaulle returned to power. France had been playing a major part in European politics for centuries. Its victories alternated with defeats, but the main thing did not change: France was the leading power in Europe. This left its imprint on the national consciousness and influenced the behavior of the leaders of the Fourth Republic, not to mention de Gaulle, who resolutely revived the idea of the preeminence of France to counterbalance the United States' domination of the postwar Atlantic system. To a considerable extent, this historical influence is still present today.

After de Gaulle had carried out a major constitutional reform and instituted a strong presidency, he proposed the new theory of European security which led to fierce conflicts with the United States. The basic premises of this theory are important in an understanding of France's current foreign policy, which clearly sets it apart from the rest of Western Europe (although the Gaullist doctrine of European security was deformed by the "Atlantic" pressure exerted on it by the United States, England, the FRG, and other countries, and even by rightwing forces in France itself, it nevertheless has a definite effect on French policy today). In essence, de Gaulle believed that Western Europe should rely on its

own strength to guarantee its own security. To attain this goal, de Gaulle felt it would be necessary, on the one hand, to form a politico-military confederation of West European countries and create a "Europe of homelands" and, on the other, to relieve tension in Europe and lessen the confrontation between the blocs—which was, according to de Gaulle's firm conviction, the "superpowers'" main instrument of domination. As a result, the postwar security system was to be replaced, according to de Gaulle's plan, with a new system distinguished by a balance of power at a low level between the USSR and a confederated Western Europe, the neutralization of the Eastern European states as a result of the development of political pluralism there, the restoration of the close historic ties between Western and Eastern European countries, and the complete eradication of the postwar division of the continent. It is significant that the new system of European security was expected by the Gaullists to affirm France's leadership, extend its influence to the entire European continent, and restore its traditional historic role to some extent.

Because de Gaulle's actions matched his words, the attempts to carry out this plan led to serious conflicts with the United States: **The American idea of European security was obviously incompatible with the French idea. The United States proceeded from the assumption that Atlanticism had to take priority over Europeanism and that NATO had to be preserved unchanged as a counterbalance to the USSR and the main instrument of U.S. influence in the Western alliance.** The United States was disturbed by the autonomous efforts of France and then of the FRG to relieve tension. After Western Europe had been liberated from German occupation by American troops, after its economic recovery had been made possible by the Marshall Plan (and the capitalist order had been stabilized as a result of this), and after the Old World had been offered nuclear guarantees, the United States believed it was completely justified in retaining and even strengthening its role as the Atlantic leader.

In de Gaulle's time, France not only withdrew from the NATO military organization but also opposed J. Kennedy's "Grand Design" of transatlantic integration and played the decisive role in preventing its implementation. France put up the strongest resistance in Western Europe to the creation of the multilateral NATO nuclear forces—an instrument of U.S. control over the allies in the nuclear sphere (this American idea also turned out to be impracticable). In contrast to England, France rejected the U.S. offer of American Polaris missiles in exchange for its consent to integrate French nuclear forces into the NATO structure.

France's closest allies in Europe, England and the FRG, did not support the Gaullist theory of European security, however, and primarily because de Gaulle's plan envisaged the eventual separation of Western Europe from the United States. For several reasons, especially their strong politico-military dependence on the United States, they adhered to the traditional NATO idea of security. No one followed France's example by withdrawing from the

NATO military organization in those years. The centrifugal tendencies in the bloc (which de Gaulle foresaw) began to grow stronger later.

Difficulties of Mutual Adaptation

Although American-French relations improved at first under G. Pompidou, this was only a temporary thaw. When Washington was unable to gain control of French nuclear forces in the 1960's with an agreement similar to the Anglo-American agreement in Nassau (on deliveries of U.S. launchers for English submarines), it suggested a new type of cooperation to Paris in the beginning of the 1970's—to be based on coordination rather than subordination. The purpose was to attach France, which was autonomously building up its own nuclear forces, more closely to NATO without offending French pride. According to a recent article in the summer issue of *FOREIGN POLICY* by Princeton University Professor R. Ulman, in 1972 the United States began supplying France with information about the technology for the development of new types of nuclear weapons in accordance with a secret agreement. In exchange, Paris agreed to coordinate the aiming of its missiles at Soviet targets with Washington and to work with the NATO integrated military command. Later, in 1978, the two countries concluded a secret agreement on the delivery of American supercomputers (previously banned for export) to France in exchange for Paris' promise of even broader politico-military cooperation with the United States and NATO. As the new major U.S. initiative known as the "Year of Europe" got underway in spring 1973, however, France, as the leader of Europeanism, began resisting Atlanticism in every way possible. Besides this, the American-French dispute acquired a new dimension: France began acting on behalf of the EEC, as the leader of the process of West European political integration the EEC had launched at the turn of the decade. France stubbornly opposed the United States' main plan of expanding the Atlantic system and combining politico-military issues in a single package with economic and energy problems, which certainly would have increased U.S. influence in the allied countries. The sharp disagreements with France over the "Year of Europe" were compounded by conflicts over such major issues as the Middle East crisis and Western energy policy. In the second volume of his memoirs, H. Kissinger wrote that "if France insisted on freedom of action in the Middle East, refused to participate in a consumer grouping on energy, and saw no point in any 'Atlantic declaration,' little was left of the Atlantic dialogue."¹ In spring 1974, the disagreements reached the point of unprecedented events: The President of the United States publicly threatened the allies with a revision of the American politico-military guarantees to Western Europe—i.e., the bases of the entire Atlantic system and of "bloc" security in Europe. Addressing his remarks primarily to France, he declared that the allies could not "have U.S. participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political front."²

When a definite choice had to be made, no one in Western Europe saw France as an alternative to politico-military reliance on the United States, and France itself could not aspire to this role. Even today, 15 years later, Paris is not assuming these obligations. When President F. Mitterand addressed members of the government and the armed forces command on 11 October 1988 on defense policy planning, he stressed that the French nuclear forces could not guarantee the security of the FRG (not to mention all of Western Europe—V.M.).

This has not kept France from assuming the role of Europeanism's leader; it has much broader scope for foreign policy maneuvers in the Atlantic system and the system of East-West relations than, for instance, England. In the 1970's, however, French policy on matters of European security became more pragmatic and they can still be described in this way today. France is trying to avoid the exacerbation of political relations between the United States and Western Europe to the point at which Washington would publicly threaten a revision of its politico-military guarantees to the allies, as it did when G. Pompidou was president. Paris agrees with the idea of West European politico-military integration with the aim of strengthening the "European pillar" of the North Atlantic alliance. This is the basic postulate of the Western European Union's "Security Platform," a policy planning document signed by France. When President F. Mitterand was interviewed on the TF-1 television network in the middle of July 1988, he stressed that the idea of separating the United States from Europe is an illusion. In September 1988, H. Vedrine, official spokesman for the Palais Elysee, said that France felt it was "exceptionally important" to conduct an analysis of the current international situation in conjunction with the United States and to elaborate a common stance on disarmament, regional conflicts, and several other issues.

France has had to adjust its foreign policy in line with the Atlanticism of the FRG, England, Italy, and other countries. It remembers that the allies did not support France's objections in the middle of the 1970's when the decision was being made on the establishment of a new institution of the Atlantic system—the International Energy Agency.

The growing strength of the Atlantic tendency in French foreign policy in the second half of the 1970's was the result of domestic politics (the Gaullists lost the presidency in spring 1974) and international politics: The foreign policy of the USSR began displaying more reliance on force in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The deployment of the SS-20 missiles, the entry of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, and the USSR's willingness, as the West assumed, to react to the events in Poland with a show of force helped to bring France closer together with the United States and NATO. After all, it was no coincidence that de Gaulle regarded stable detente in Europe as an essential condition for the success of his European security plan.

The changes in French policy, however, were only one side of the matter. The main cause of the improvement of American-French relations in the second half of the 1970's was the United States' renunciation of major Atlantic initiatives like the "Year of Europe" (the Carter administration felt that they were counterproductive and insulting to the allies). The American idea of the "great Atlantic civilization" turned out to be groundless in the face of mounting West European independence. Although Reagan resolved to strengthen American leadership in the Western alliance at the beginning of the 1980's, he did not undertake any broad-scale assaults on Europeanism. The slight increase in Atlantic tendencies in the foreign policy of the West European countries was less a result of the United States' plans than of increasing international tension. The following fact is indicative: When the United States tried to exacerbate the situation artificially by insisting that the allies refuse to take part in the massive Siberia-Western Europe pipeline project with the USSR, all of its attempts were futile. The Old World resisted this excessively "Atlantic" initiative.

Current Status of Atlanticism and Europeanism

France's ability to maneuver on the Atlantic level and to improve relations with the United States is limited by, first of all, its desire to be independent of Washington, an independence it regards as the main prerequisite for stronger French influence in the world, and second, its hope of lessening the confrontation between the blocs in Europe within the framework of the all-Europe process of strengthening security and trust.

It is important to remember that the French nuclear strategy of "dissuasion" differs sharply from the American strategy. According to French estimates, the use of less than half of France's present supply of nuclear weapons in combat would immediately kill 20 million people and wound approximately the same number. In terms of the number of warheads, however, French nuclear forces are equivalent to around 2 percent of American forces. Because of the low number of France's nuclear weapons in comparison with the USSR and the United States, French strategy is naturally devoid of "counterforce" potential and cannot be based on plans for a preemptive strike against Soviet military targets.

President Mitterand has not concealed his criticism of the American strategy of "flexible response" as a dangerous and destabilizing idea which has always had the tendency to augment first-strike counterforce potential. Besides this, Mitterand does not believe, just as de Gaulle did not believe, that the United States would be willing to sacrifice Washington for the sake of Paris even if it were to accept the strategy of "massive retaliation" (which he regards as the true strategy of deterring and preventing war). But if neither the American strategy of "flexible response" nor the acceptance of "massive retaliation" as the U.S. strategy would satisfy France as a means of guaranteeing West European security, what would? Only a West European defense. This reflects one of the contradictions in French policy, engendered by the

conflicting European and Atlantic tendencies in this policy and by the incompatibility of strictly national nuclear forces with the hope of West European integration. On the one hand, France is willing to support, especially on a short- or medium-range basis, a U.S. military presence in Europe (although not on sovereign French territory!), but on the other it is taking steps and measures to reduce Western Europe's dependence on the United States and to oppose Atlanticism with stronger Europeanist affiliations.

It was France, after all, that objected to Western Europe's participation in the SDI, and did not merely object, but launched a genuine diplomatic struggle by countering the SDI with the EUREKA program of broad-scale technological integration in Western Europe in the most advanced fields with a view to the 21st century. This was demonstrated again in 1984, when the French president proposed (although unsuccessfully) the establishment of a West European military reconnaissance station in space. What was the purpose of this proposal? Once again, it was the reduction of Western Europe's military dependence on the United States.

Just before the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva in 1985, Ronald Reagan suggested a special meeting of the leaders of the seven main Western countries for the purpose of, so to speak, closing ranks. It was France, and no one else, that objected to this and split Atlantic unity, and this also attests to the continued existence of some Gaullist potential in its foreign policy.

Regardless of the problematic aspects of West European politico-military integration, a process in which the actions of Paris, London, and Bonn frequently resemble the behavior of the characters in the famous fable about the swan, the crab, and the pike, its main driving force, despite considerable difficulties, has been France. The French leadership wants to reduce Western Europe's politico-military dependence on the United States: After all, any serious attempt at integration, such as the creation of a West European army or a purely West European military command, would unavoidably contribute to the French hope of weakening the rigid and inequitable Atlantic structures and American dominion.

It is unlikely that France is carrying out aggressive plans against the USSR in its attempts to promote integration by creating a brigade of 4,000 soldiers and officers, in conjunction with the FRG and independent of the NATO military command, as a prototype of a West European defense force. These are merely attempts to strengthen West European autonomy and map the route for the development of military integration on a defensive basis. Furthermore, as the process of detente in Europe grows stronger and develops more quickly, it is probable that France and other countries will gradually lose interest in the creation of a militarily strong West European "power center" and in an arms buildup.

The American and French approaches to detente in Europe—both by means of bilateral political dialogue

with the USSR and other socialist countries and by means of the development of the all-Europe process—have their similarities and their differences. Their similarities are the result of social and politico-military factors, concern about the balance of power between East and West, the fact that both countries belong to the Atlantic system, and their fundamental conviction that the rights of citizens must be placed above the "claims or demands of the state." The differences stem from the United States' hope of retaining the leading position in the Atlantic camp and France's attempts to strengthen its own influence in Europe by lessening the confrontation between blocs, the significance of the Atlantic system, and the influence of the United States.

We must remember that France was the first Western country to embark on the road of detente and to develop political dialogue with the socialist countries in the 1960's, and it did this on its own, without any concern for Washington's reaction. This underscored its independence and was a move from the bipolar model of European security to the new system de Gaulle described as "a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

When the FRG followed France down the road of detente in the late 1960's and early 1970's, one of the central aims of U.S. foreign policy was to take control of the situation and direct the processes related to detente into the common Atlantic channel. For this reason, we can assume that now that the tendency toward detente in Europe is growing stronger again, the United States will try to control these processes again. Conflicts are already apparent. For instance, the United States and England would prefer to modernize NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, but France is playing the middleman between them and the FRG, which would prefer a show of restraint. Another example is the major issue of the extension of credit to the USSR. The United States and England are "against" this, but the FRG and France are "for" it. These disagreements are neither instantaneous nor incidental. They occur because France has a greater interest than the United States in European detente for the reasons mentioned above. The FRG also has its own motives: People there associate the alleviation of tension between the blocs with the hope of developing intra-German relations and enhancing the prospects—however distant they might seem—for the peaceful reunification of the two German states. England has traditionally been closer to the United States than the continental powers because of their historical ties and its strong attachment to Washington in the nuclear sphere. It is indicative that when the outlines of the grand unified market became visible on the West European horizon and when the plans were finalized for its complete establishment by 1993, it was England that began making serious stipulations, questioning, for example, the possibility of introducing a single currency and creating a central West European bank. (And what kind of unified market would it be without the cementing link of a common monetary unit?) England has less political

incentive than France or the FRG to lessen the confrontation between the blocs and to increase Western Europe's autonomy in relations with the United States.

But let us return to France. Although after de Gaulle its efforts to replace the postwar European security system with a new model were gradually neutralized by Atlantic pressure from the allies and from the French public and as a result of the deterioration of East-West relations in the second half of the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's, France's interest in developing the all-Europe process instead of a "bloc dialogue" is still quite perceptible. In an IZVESTIYA interview, President Mitterand said that "the partition of Europe in the last world war put most of the European states, with the exception of the USSR, in a dependent position, and I would like them to emerge from this position."³ In 1980, when the United States essentially wanted to halt the all-Europe process because of the events in Poland and Afghanistan, France resisted. At the beginning of the 1980's it had more vehement objections to the U.S. attempts to prevent economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the USSR. Paris wants to cut down the prohibitive lists of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom), which are based on American export legislation.

European Security: On What Basis?

The tendencies de Gaulle once foresaw are now growing stronger in European politics. They include, above all, more active West European integration, a stronger foundation for West European autonomy, and reduced West European dependence on the United States. Furthermore, as F. Mitterand said in the previously mentioned speech in the Higher Institute of National Defense, when Western Europe has established a unified market, it will realize that "it cannot exist without the ability to secure its own defense." In view of the president's remarks about the "fatal effects" of a break between North America and Western Europe and the need to build up the European pillar of the North Atlantic alliance, however, we can assume that the present model of French relations with NATO—non-participation in the bloc's integrated military command and the desire for a partnership based on equality and independence with the United States—is regarded by people in Paris as a promising model of relations between the United States and the integrated Western Europe. "We cannot suddenly make Europe (Western—V.M.) the master of its own fate, but if we are wise enough to proceed gradually, we will reach this goal," Mitterand said when he was interviewed by an American weekly news magazine.⁴

We must say that the number of people who support the reduction of the American military presence in Europe is rising even in the United States, and among conservatives as well as liberals. After all, American expenditures on the defense of Europe constitute a gigantic sum—around half of the entire U.S. military budget. Although at this time Washington is stubbornly defending the presence of a few dozen of its fighter planes in Western

Europe even though Spain wants to get rid of them, all of this, combined with the mounting "anti-European" and "pro-Asian" feelings in the United States, suggests that de Gaulle may have been right when he predicted that the United States would "abandon Europe" in the future.

Returning to the tendencies, the second one is the democratization of domestic politics in the socialist countries and the development of political pluralism in Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary). The gradual restoration of the historic ties between Eastern and Western Europe on this basis is an important postulate of the French idea of European security. Although France is wary of the neutralist tendencies in domestic politics in the FRG, it nevertheless regards these tendencies in the East European states as a desirable and natural process as long as the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the integrated Western Europe is maintained (at a lower level) in the future.

Third, there is the development of detente in Europe, pioneered by the USSR in the East and France in the West. Although the serious transformation of the current security system is still a distant prospect, "the postwar era in international relations," H. Kissinger remarked, "is coming to an end.... Plans for the reunification of Europe with the consent of all Europeans are conceivable for the first time since World War I."⁵

These three long-range tendencies are intermeshed and represent an equation with several unknown quantities. The main question is the following: How, on what basis, will a new European security system be established in place of the current one, especially if it has to be more stable than the traditional postwar system? The first steps in this direction are self-evident: The level of arms must be lowered, and the armed forces of the two sides must be given a non-offensive nature. France realizes that a negative attitude toward disarmament and the insistence on France's traditional independence would be counterproductive and inappropriate at a time of practical moves to establish a common European home—"Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." For this reason, Paris supports conventional arms reduction on the continent.

As for nuclear weapons, France is against participation in arms reduction negotiations in a situation in which its forces are equivalent to only a fraction of Soviet and American forces. After all, even if the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States were to be reduced by 50 percent, French forces, in terms of the number of warheads (at the present time), would be equivalent to just over 3 percent of these arsenals. Paris is willing to take part in negotiations if the USSR and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to dimensions comparable to the size of French forces, if the "superpowers" stop developing new types of antimissile, antisatellite, and antisubmarine systems, and if the imbalances in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional arms are eliminated. Furthermore, **Paris regards nuclear**

weapons not only as an instrument for the "deterrence" of the USSR, but also as the means of securing autonomous status in the Atlantic system, a certain degree of independence in relations with the United States, and political influence and leadership in Western Europe. Nuclear missiles are also viewed as an instrument for the neutralization of the FRG's superior economic strength, which is an essential attribute of a great power.

At a press conference on 18 May this year, F. Mitterand announced his intention to reduce the scales of French military construction with a view to the tendency toward detente in East-West relations. This does not mean that any major military programs will be scrapped, but it does mean that they will take longer to complete, because defense allocations will be reduced by 8 or 9 percent in 1990-1993.

At the start of the Bush administration there was every indication that the disagreements, between the United States on one side and France and England on the other, over nuclear deterrence, which R. Reagan called "immoral," defending the SDI and shocking the allies, would be surmounted. Once again, the three leading Western powers are taking a stance in favor of nuclear weapons. Although France has objected to excessive haste in the modernization of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, it is still carrying out its own national program for the development of tactical nuclear weapons with a range of 350 kilometers, comparable to the range of the American missiles that aroused the intense disagreements in NATO.

The West Europeans frequently complain that it is easier for the USSR to find a common language with the United States than with France or England in discussions of military policy because it underestimates the autonomous West European security interests. But whether we like it or not, the lessening of confrontation between the blocs and the intensification of centrifugal tendencies in the Atlantic system will cause the West Europeans, especially the French, to take a greater interest in alternative methods of safeguarding their security, both by means of arms reduction and by means of West European politico-military integration. Judging by all indications, the West is not striving to achieve military supremacy over the USSR. It is concerned about the effects the progress in the construction of the European home might have on stability in Europe.

The West's suspicions of the Soviet idea of a non-violent, nuclear-free world are the reason for its conviction that any progress in building the all-Europe structures will necessitate substantial guarantees of stability and the maintenance of a military balance between the USSR and the West, at a lower level but necessarily a balance of power. After all, there is still no question of "universal and total disarmament."

In view of the West's adherence to nuclear deterrence, we have to answer several specific questions: What is the defensive military doctrine of the USSR on the strategic

level and on the regional European level from the standpoint of the structure of nuclear forces? How many warheads will be sufficient for the reliable safeguarding of security? The common standards of frankness in the sphere of defense for the East and the West will require us to report current and projected military programs. Broader questions will also arise during the construction of the common European home: What is democracy, as a common human value? What are the other common human values? What are the political rights of the individual? How can East-West economic and technological cooperation be developed when their economic structures are so incompatible?

After decades of confrontation and brief thaws, an excessively abrupt turnabout in Soviet foreign policy would be enough in itself, as experience has shown, to arouse the suspicions of influential groups in the West, although some of the major moves of the Soviet side, such as the renunciation of ideological confrontation and the declaration of the primacy of common human interests in international relations, have noticeably improved the political climate in Europe and the rest of the world. Judging by all indications, however, the West does not intend to make any cardinal changes in its policy on European security. People in the United States, France, and other countries believe that a departure from traditional security structures will be made possible not by a belief in a non-violent, nuclear-free world, but only by the actual establishment of alternative political and military structures—a lengthy and contradictory process including such unknown quantities as, for example, the German question. This approach must be taken into account, because the common European home can only be built through joint efforts.

Footnotes

1. H. Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval," London, 1982, p 728.
2. Ibid., p 932.
3. IZVESTIYA, 2 December 1987.
4. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 7 March 1988, p 45.
5. NEWSWEEK, 19 September 1988, p 25.

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FROM THE HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Soviet Union and United States: Mutual Perceptions
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[Article by Konstantin Viktorovich Pleshakov, candidate of historical sciences and scientific associate at

Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies; article is based on author's report at conference of Soviet and American historians in Athens (Ohio) in October 1988 on Soviet-American relations in 1950-1955; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] People and governments, the subjects of international relations, have to deal with other people and governments and with their own views of them as objects of foreign policy.

International relations differ from interaction in inanimate nature because direct, "pure," and "objective" contact is possible only in the second case, only where there is no psyche (or developed psyche, if we agree with P. Teilhard de Chardin that psychic energy is present all matter).¹ Whereas the connections between molecules depend only on their objective characteristics and the objective conditions of their environment, interpersonal contacts (and international relations are a specific form of these) are not direct, but are mediated by perceptions or, more precisely, by mutual perceptions. This is why the factor of mutual perceptions is just as significant in international relations as the objective factors in this sphere.

Invisible prisms of perception stand between people, refracting objective reality and distorting the partners' view of this reality. The degree of distortion is sometimes inordinate. In some cases, facts of the same type can even be regarded as completely different phenomena (we all know, for example, the phrase, "we have intelligence agents but they have spies"). Whereas false perceptions (or what psychologists call misperceptions) are impossible in the "communication" between molecules, the talent man has acquired for thinking sometimes works against him. This is why the analysis of mutual perceptions in international relations is necessary. The most diverse approaches to a single matter are possible here because there is still no unanimous opinion in international relations with regard to certain symbols and stereotypes (for example, the "enemy image"). The analytical basis of the author's research was developed with the help of Ye.V. Yegorova and with consideration for the research and ideas of R. Jervis, R. Tucker, J. Stoessinger, and other researchers.

The Real Basis of "Imaginary" Fears

When we discuss mutual misperceptions in Soviet-American relations, we certainly cannot call the American and Soviet views of one another completely irrational. No, the real policies of both powers have provided sufficient reason for each to experience the most serious fears for its own security.

The reader knows about the postwar American leadership's wish to build the world on the principles of the "Pax Americana" and about all of the steps the United States took in this direction—from the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which was of a clearly intimidating nature (although, incidentally, we did not protest it in 1945), to the delivery of weapons to opposition groups in Afghanistan.

Something else, however, is also worth remembering: The West (and the United States had assumed the responsibility for its security) had fairly serious grounds for apprehensions about the stability of the borders of independent countries. The reader can find the American view of the history of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's in books by T. Anderson, S. Bialer, J. Gaddis, A. Iriye, G. Kennan, W. Lippman, R. Pruessen, W. Rostow, W. Stueck, G. Herken, M. Schaller, and M. Shulman (these are only some of the most well-known authors).² Before sending the reader off to look at these books, however, we should take at least a brief look at the foreign policy actions of the Soviet leadership of that time which gave rise to the completely understandable feelings of suspicion and even outright fear in the inhabitants of the Western countries opposed by the Soviet Union.

It was no one other than Stalin himself that called the USSR the "base of world revolution," and this is what the Soviet Union actually was at first. There were attempts at first to expand the "world revolution" through the inclusion of Eastern and Central Europe and then of Asia. In the pre-war years Stalin's policy left no doubt in the West that he might disregard collective security interests and international law (not to mention, of course, moral standards) at any time, in spite of the need to resist fascism. The Soviet-German pact of 23 August 1939 was seen as an arrangement with Hitler for the division of spheres of influence, which was followed by another partition of Poland, the restoration of the borders of the old empire through the inclusion of the territories of the Western Ukraine, Belorussia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and three independent Baltic states, and the start of the Soviet-Finnish war. In a show of "goodwill" toward Hitler, Stalin turned over the German and Austrian antifascist emigres in the USSR to the fuhrer and effectively ordered the communist parties in the countries occupied by the Nazis not to resist the aggressors—until 22 June 1941.

We are also reminded that Stalin's actions in the postwar years included the Berlin blockade (the Berlin crisis of 1948) and the support of the military actions in Korea. After promising the allies something like the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe,³ he then managed to direct events in such a way that all of the countries of Eastern Europe where Soviet troops were stationed after the start of the war began building political regimes of the Stalinist type with a show of amazing unanimity. Yugoslavia, the only country which dared to resist his diktat, was immediately branded a fascist state and was subjected to the strictest economic and political boycotts.

Unfortunately, even after Stalin's death the new leaders pursued a policy that was sometimes quite inconsistent with the resolutions of the 20th party congress. For many years, people in the West made references to the "Brezhnev doctrine," in accordance with which, as Western analysts wrote, the Soviet Union felt justified in using any means whatsoever, including military force, to intervene in the affairs of socialist countries. In fact, this did

happen in 1968 in Czechoslovakia (although N.S. Khrushchev began the trend by sending tanks to Budapest just 9 months after the 20th congress). Who can guarantee, people in the West asked, that the USSR will not extend the doctrine a little farther to the west? They also remember the rigid stance on China, the attempts to move the nuclear confrontation closer to U.S. territory (the "Cuban missile crisis," which is called the Caribbean crisis in our country), the deliveries of weapons to developing countries which sometimes used them in wars against each other, and, finally, Khrushchev's unfortunate statement: "We will bury you." All of this undermined the theoretical postulate concerning the peaceful nature of Soviet policy and the USSR's consistent adherence to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The troops sent to Afghanistan could be put at the end of this list....

This is how our opponents see the foreign policy of the USSR.

How the Soviet Union Sees America

Whereas American perceptions of the Soviet Union can be traced in a variety of materials, the "closed" nature of Soviet society in those years often forces us to confine ourselves to mere guesswork when we try to analyze how the leaders of the USSR viewed the United States, the role of the Soviet Union in the world, and the future of the world itself.

How did people in the Soviet Union view the United States in the first postwar years, when our basic "mis-perceptions"—the ones which are still influencing us today—came into being?

It has become quite typical—first for researchers in the United States and now for those in the Soviet Union as well—to see Stalin as the evil genius of the era. Without underrating his crimes, the actions which any court of history would find unforgivable, we must nevertheless stipulate that he expressed the prevailing feelings in the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)]. "Revolutionary romanticism" was characteristic of the party as a whole. This also applied to its view of the world. After Stalin had risen to power on the wave of revolutionary fervor and had borrowed his theories from prominent party leaders, he did much to "disgrace" them with his great-power chauvinism (which was already being pointed out by V.I. Lenin).⁴ It was Stalin who must be given the dubious credit for combining revolutionary romanticism with a return to the goals and methods of the empire builders. The first serious revision of this conglomerate of ideals occurred in the middle of the 1950's, but some of its elements are still alive in Soviet society today, and it is against these that the perestroika in thinking, in ideology, and in foreign policy is directed.

For this reason, before we discuss the image of the United States in the USSR, we must take a look at how Stalin and other leaders in the past perceived their own country—i.e., their self-perceptions.

Although Stalin was absolutely correct in seeing the USSR as a country which had borne most of the brunt of Hitler's aggression and had played a decisive part in the victory over fascism, he went far beyond all reasonable limits in his praise of the country he governed. "The Soviet Union," Stalin said at the 19th CPSU Congress, "crushed the German and Japanese fascist tyranny and saved the people of Europe and Asia from the threat of fascist enslavement."⁵ In this way, he denied the great services performed by the allies in the anti-fascist coalition. He saw the struggle for postwar spheres of influence in Europe and the Far East, which had already begun during the war,⁶ as a means of expanding the USSR's influence in the world—acting in line with the idea that "we have to get them before they get us." Peaceful coexistence, which Lenin once defined as the fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy, received only verbal acknowledgement from Stalin. In his opinion, the Soviet Union had to continue its mission of organizing world revolution. There was no question that the entire world could be converted to socialism by force (even if this did not necessarily mean a direct confrontation between opposing sides). It is indicative that Stalin's last speech—at the 19th CPSU Congress—was wholly devoted to the prospects for victory by the "fraternal parties" in the capitalist countries.⁷

Now we can move on to the image of the United States. The "image" of any country consists of the **informed image, symbolic image, and projected image** (the terms were added to social psychology by the well-known Soviet researcher A.N. Leontyev). It is also influenced by stereotypes, the relative significance of which changes in line with the degree of bias in the view of the world. It is precisely among these stereotypes that the highest number of "mis-perceptions" can be found.

The **informed image** of the United States in the USSR was minimal. Stalin did not know and did not want to know anything about the realities of American life. He did not know anything about the political structure or the nature of authority and government in the United States or in other Western democracies and was content with a stereotypical view of America as a society where the people had no voice and where all power was in the hands of a small group of capitalists who brutally suppressed the personal freedoms of citizens. "So-called 'personal freedom' no longer exists; the rights of the individual are recognized only in those who own capital, and all other citizens are viewed as raw human material suitable only for exploitation," Stalin concluded in 1952.⁸ Because Stalin based his views on his own experience in heading a government where authority and power were concentrated in the hands of a small group of individuals, we can assume that he did suspect that the American society was ruled by "billionaires and millionaires who see war as a lucrative venture producing colossal profits."⁹ Incidentally, this stereotype outlasted Stalin, the 20th party congress, and subsequent years. Stalin wanted to see and did see signs of real opposition to the existing order in the American society, opposition

with the aim of altering the American society to conform to the image of the Soviet Union of those years.

As for Stalin's view of the American economy, he anticipated a repetition of the crisis (the "Great Depression") and the gradual decline and "decay" of the economic organism based on private ownership. In a conversation with H. Stassen in 1947, he asked him twice whether an economic crisis was anticipated in the United States and then listened in disbelief to Stassen's assurances of the opposite.¹⁰

Stalin also had an unequivocal view of U.S. foreign policy. Although he was quite justified in seeing the consolidation of the United States' military-strategic positions along the perimeter of the Soviet borders as an objective threat, and in seeing the United States' "special" relationships with some countries as interference in their internal affairs—i.e., although his assessment of the actual implications of American policy was correct in general—Stalin was nevertheless wrong in his assessment of the main thing: the motives of the American side.

In Stalin's time, the statement that "American imperialism, using its 'concern' for peace and democracy as a cover, started a criminal war" became an indispensable cliché in the Soviet news media. Virtually all of the United States' major actions in the world arena, however, including the actions which affected the future of Germany, China, and Korea, were not wholly the result of evil intrigues, but were also occasioned, first of all, by genuine fear of the growing strength of the Soviet Union and, second, by genuine concern for peace and democracy—to the degree to which these concepts were recognized in the United States at that time. Stalin misinterpreted the motives for the United States' involvement in the Korean conflict and the related UN actions and even spoke of the attempts to turn the United Nations "into an instrument of war, into a means of starting a new world war."¹¹

The symbolic image of the United States was one-dimensional for Stalin by the end of the 1940's. Whereas he believed that the Western democracies posed a greater threat to peace than Hitler in the pre-war years, after the war his view of the United States was even more primitive. The United States was the number-one enemy, it was the chief threat to all progressive forces on earth, and all of the people of the planet would have to unite against it. When the Korean War started, Stalin saw the United States as the center of the "aggressive nucleus"¹² taking shape in the West.

There is no question, however, that by the end of the 1940's Stalin saw the United States as an absolute enemy. This one-dimensional view seems incredible today. One book on the Korean War specifically said that "the American imperialists have flagrantly violated international law and have defied the elementary rules of human behavior and are committing acts of such monstrous evil in Korea that even the savagery of the

Hitlerist cannibals seems pale in comparison."¹³ An excess of emotion compensated for the shortage of information.

The projected (or desired future) image is just as obvious: the isolation of the United States in the world arena or, ideally, the elimination of the United States as the largest imperialist state. The destruction of the United States by force was certainly never a declared aim, and it is possible that it was never planned, but.... Only an incompetent military establishment would have neglected to map out these scenarios among others. In any case—and this is extremely important—the possibility of a Soviet victory in a military conflict was declared, and the socio-ideological nature of this victory was clearly defined. In 1949, for example, G. Malenkov asked: "Can there be any doubt at all that if the imperialists start a third world war, this war will be the grave of not just a few capitalist states this time, but of all world capitalism."¹⁴

How America Sees the Soviet Union

On 10 July 1950 President H. Truman announced that "the people of the world see the United States of America as a mighty stronghold of freedom, and we have given them our solemn promise to work side by side with other free nations so that people throughout the world will live in freedom and peace."¹⁵

The United States saw itself, just as the Soviet Union did, as the last hope of mankind and did not doubt its right to moral leadership and supremacy. In fact, when nuclear weapons came into being, only one country in the West could and did become a great nuclear power, and it certainly could not have any enemies in the Western camp. The division into "us" and "them" quickly disappeared there, and the concept of "them" was transferred to the east.

The United States thereby became the nation protecting the "free world" on the front line of defense. The American society was prepared for this. After all, messianism was part of the foundation of the American political culture, both as a result of the visible successes of the Protestant ethic on American soil and because of the multi-ethnic nature of the immigrants who had found a "promised land" with unprecedented opportunities, rights, and freedoms. This is why it was so easy for America to take on the role of the savior of mankind after the war.

The informed image of the Soviet Union in America in the 1950's was oversimplified to the extreme. On 30 June 1950 Truman declared: "We must not respond with hatred to the hatred these people (Soviet citizens—K.P.) have been taught to feel for us. We must realize that they are the victims of a cynical group of leaders."¹⁶

But was this hatred really unanimous? The prevailing opinion in the United States was that Stalin's regime was held up by bayonets. This was not true at all. There was no widespread opposition even to the dispossession of

the kulaks. Even the peasantry submitted to the regime's wishes in general. The problem of the "great non-resistance" to Stalin might be the most poorly explained phenomenon in Soviet history, but people in the United States did not see the natural causes of this "great non-resistance."

People in America did not realize that the absolute majority of the population in the USSR could not conceive of any other order than the socialist one—and what is more, to our deepest regret, precisely in the Stalinist form. The fact that Stalinist socialism began to take shape almost at the same time as the Soviet Government made it the only valid form in the eyes of the absolute majority of the population. People in America spoke of the "oppression of the majority by a minority" and of coercion. Did they exist? Yes, they did exist, but they were not as primitive as they were in the American view. After all, the Stalinist system was held up just as much by conviction as by coercion. The idealism of the Soviet people was incomprehensible to the Americans. They saw only servile submission—or cynicism. The underestimation of this idealism, which motivated people to work today under incredibly difficult conditions, and for only symbolic wages, for the sake of the higher goals of tomorrow, and of their ineradicable patriotism caused the Americans to also underestimate the economic, scientific, and technical potential of the Soviet Union. The American reaction to the appearance of the atomic bomb in the USSR in fall 1949 was shock bordering on panic.

The American view of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was almost the same as the view of American foreign policy in the USSR. Of course, we must distinguish between genuine misunderstandings and self-seeking alarmism and, finally, the completely accurate assessment of Stalin's foreign policy, which was principled and peaceful much less often than we would have liked.

The notorious document known as NSC-68 (1950) said that "the Kremlin plans to impose its own system on other nations in ways which will destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of the atomic bomb gives these plans renewed strength and increases the danger to our own system."¹⁷ Although the authors of NSC-68 were correct in their perception of the projected image, or the desirable (for Stalin) future image, of the United States (the elimination of capitalism), they were wrong about something else—they "fore-saw" the possibility of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, and in 1950. Furthermore, the document said that the aims of Soviet aggression would be the seizure of Western Europe (with the exception of the Scandinavian countries and the Iberian peninsula), access to Middle Eastern oil, the reinforcement of Soviet influence in the Far East, the control of Atlantic and Pacific shipping lanes, and a selective atomic attack on targets in Alaska, and possibly in other parts of the United States and Canada. Even if we take Stalin's great-power ambitions into account, it is highly improbable that he could have

planned this kind of global offensive war against the West by the beginning of the 1950's. If Stalin did pin his hopes on anything, it was probably the support and stimulation of leftist forces in Europe and the anti-imperialist movement on other continents. The real prospect of world war must have been frightening even to him.

By the beginning of the 1950's the American leadership was clearly convinced that America was involved in an uncompromising struggle for the future of the world, although it was still only in the form of local conflicts. In a speech in Laramie (Wyoming) on 9 May 1950, President Truman described communism as a "combination of various evils," the "newest form of tyranny," and a "new and powerful form of imperialism."¹⁸ On 10 June in St. Louis he said that "the rulers of the Soviet Union are trying to spread their totalitarian influence through infiltration, subversive activity, propaganda, and indirect aggression."¹⁹

The belief that the Soviet Union was overly aggressive led specifically to the opinion that the war in Korea was the start of a global assault by the USSR. This is what the State Department told the army command and diplomats at midnight on 25 June 1950, advising them to "stay as alert as possible and report any positive or negative information immediately." The President ordered the immediate verification of the intentions of the USSR and its allies through intelligence channels. Today, however, the report that Stalin only consented to the preparations for military actions in Korea with great reluctance seems quite plausible.

The **symbolic image** of the Soviet Union in the United States was just as one-dimensional as the image of the United States in the USSR. There are not many cases in world history of two sides defining each other's policies in virtually the same terms of "good" and "evil." The Soviet Union was the inhuman "number-one enemy" embodying every possible negative trait and intending to transplant its values (and then its authority) to American soil. No matter what kind of situations the American administration was dealing with, it judged its own foreign policy moves from the standpoint of whether they would strengthen or weaken the Soviet Union. When the United States was fighting in Korea, it believed that it was containing the overt aggression of the Soviet Union; when it overthrew the president in Guatemala in 1955, it believed it was fighting against communist infiltration in Latin America, etc.

Finally, in the eyes of Americans, the **projected image** of the Soviet Union was categorical: the eradication of communism, although the methods of attaining this goal were seen in different ways. In the 1940's the United States did not exclude, in principle, the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the USSR (NSC 20/4 presupposed military methods of struggle that were made possible only by the nuclear monopoly—even without using the atom bomb—and it also presupposed the eradication of Soviet influence outside the territory

of "the Russian state which will be allowed to exist after the war," the elimination of the "power of the CPSU," and the establishment of a regime incapable of fighting an aggressive war and pursuing an "iron curtain" policy).²⁰ Many of the premises of NSC 20/4—virtually all methods of non-military pressure on the USSR—were carried over to NSC- 68, with the exception of point 22, which spoke of the destruction of communism by military means. Point 22 (a symbolic parallel to the "catch 22" in J. Heller's novel) was eventually excluded from the projected image; surgical intervention in the confrontation between the systems was replaced by therapy.

The American people, President Truman said, must demonstrate the "moral and physical superiority" of the free world to communism. "As the strength and effectiveness of the free system become obvious to the entire world and as the people who are now undecided return to democracy, the danger of communist dominion will diminish and eventually disappear."²¹

Twin Images

The amazing similarity of the images of America and the Soviet Union is striking. They are **one-dimensional**: There is a reluctance to see the portrait of the opponent in "color"; there is only a black- and-white "etching" made up of standard strokes (this kind of **symbolic image** easily becomes the personification of the sworn enemy);

They are **categorical**: All of the opponent's features are not simply given a personal interpretation, but this view is declared to be the final authority;

They are **stereotypical**: The **informed image** of the opponent is minimal, and stereotypes are substituted for real knowledge;

They are **asynchronous**: It is a view looking back decades into the past, like that of an astronomer who sees a star as it was ages ago (in our country, for example, the socioeconomic realities in America are seen by many as they were described in T. Dreiser's novels, and at least some experts in the United States believed until recently that we were stuck in the first post-October phase, the phase of military communism);

They are **demonized**: The opponent is seen as the personification of Absolute Evil, totally insidious to a supernatural extent;

They are **uncompromising**: The **projected image** does not permit even the thought of peaceful coexistence, not to mention the convergence of certain facets of social life, and personal survival becomes conditional only upon the death of the opponent;

They are **ideologized**: All of the partner's actions are resolutely condemned on these grounds; furthermore, the opponent's ideological precepts are not accepted or acknowledged, he is refused the right to have "ideals," and he is regarded as a cynic.

All of this is accompanied by an excessively high self-appraisal and a messianic perception of oneself and one's role as "the hope of progressive mankind"—with both sides having completely different definitions of progress.

There were also differences in the mutual perceptions of the USSR and United States. Obviously, different views of the world coexisted in the two countries. In the United States serious Sovietology existed as a science even at the beginning of the 1950's, whereas the development of Soviet studies of America essentially did not exist until the 1960's, and this means that the amount of knowledge the two sides had of one another was clearly not the same.

Anticommunism and "anticapitalism" were similar phenomena, but anti-Americanism did not take shape as a trend in the USSR, while anti-Sovietism in the United States is a regrettable fact even in our day. The apparent reason for this was the fact that in the Soviet Union there was the idea of the "two Americas"—"imperialist" and "progressive" (which was reflected in the postwar articles, books, and plays of I. Erenburg, K. Simonov, and B. Polevoy). Even Lenin advised people to take a lesson from American efficiency. There were frequent references, both at that time and much later, to such virtues of the national character as the optimism and initiative of the Americans (even Stalin made references to them). The Soviet people memorized a simple formula: The "common people" in America were "good people," and the leaders were "bad people."

Of course, the role of the leader in defining the image of the opponent differed sharply. Whereas the head of state in the United States only expressed the views of policy-making groups, Stalin, who stood at the top of the pyramid he had coldbloodedly built, decided every detail of the view of the outside world, kept the press and the arts under strict control, and personally ordained the opinions of his policymaking groups.

The Thaw in History and in Views

The new leadership headed by N.S. Khrushchev was influenced by two factors inspiring a search for new principles of relations with the United States. On the one hand, the Soviet society was gradually—even if inconsistently and too cautiously—reinterpreting Stalin's dogmas. On the other, the world community as a whole had agreed in general by the middle of the 1950's that the new military technologies demanded radical changes in international relations.

As more documents and eyewitness accounts become available to the public, we have less and less reason to see Khrushchev as the initiator of the fundamentally new approaches to international relations. It is more likely that Stalin was the obstacle preventing the evolution of the system built under his leadership, and as soon as this obstacle disappeared, a new view of the outside world began developing naturally. As for Khrushchev, he also

demonstrated all of the same features quite frequently—the revolutionary romanticism and the great-power chauvinism.

The Eisenhower administration was also influenced by new factors: external (there was a need for a conscious struggle against the danger of war) and internal (the society was disgusted with McCarthyism). There is no question that Stalin's departure from the political arena also contributed a great deal to the optimistic American view of the Soviet Union. The main factor motivating change, however, was the nuclear threat, which demanded the alleviation of tension. The idea of a military victory over the opponent was more and more likely to be confined to the thinking of only the career military. By 1954, when the foreign ministers met in Geneva, the Korean-War image of the "enemy of the human race" had been transformed into the image of an opponent with whom permanent truce negotiations had to be conducted. This "permanent truce image" was firmly established after the Caribbean crisis. It continued to exist, with a few deviations in positive or negative directions, until some time in 1985 or 1986. It was only in the last 2 or 3 years (and once again, after a radical renovation of the leadership in the Soviet Union and in connection with a spurt of intellectual energy in the country) that a new image began to take shape, the third postwar image—the "collaboration image."

It is still quite fragile, and it cannot become self-supporting without maximum tolerance and patience on both sides. The old stereotypes still prevail and are incredibly tenacious. Negative images of other countries, once they have acquired their final form, exist longer than the objective conditions giving birth to them.

The main lesson of the development of the mutual perceptions of the USSR and United States is that our knowledge and understanding of one another must increase. As P. Teilhard de Chardin wrote, "the desire to see more and better is not a whim, not idle curiosity, and not a luxury. See or die."²²

Footnotes

1. P. Teilhard de Chardin, "The Phenomenon of Man," Moscow, 1987, p 55.

2. See, in particular, T. Anderson, "The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947," Columbia (Missouri), 1981; S. Bialer, "The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline," New York, 1986; J. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," New York, 1987; G. Herken, "The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War," New York, 1980; A. Iriye, "The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction," Englewood Cliffs, 1974; G. Kennan, "Memoirs: 1925-1950," Boston, 1967; W. Lippman, "The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy," New York, 1947; R. Pruessen, "John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power," New York, 1982; W. Rostow, "Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955," Austin, 1982; M. Schaller, "The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945," New York, 1979; M.

Shulman, "Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised," New York, 1969; W. Stueck, "The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950," Chapel Hill, 1981; W. Taubman, "Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War," New York, 1982.

3. In 1946 Stalin referred only to the USSR's desire "to ensure the existence of governments loyal to the Soviet Union in these countries," offering the rationale that "the Germans invaded the USSR through Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary...because governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in those countries then" ("Interview with PRAVDA Correspondent on Churchill's Speech of 13 March 1946," Moscow, 1946, pp 8, 7).

4. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 361.

5. I.V. Stalin, "Speech at 19th Party Congress, 14 October 1952," Moscow, 1953, p 5.

6. "Tegeranskaya konferentsiya rukovoditeley trekh soyuznykh derzhav—SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii. Sb. dokumentov" [The Tehran Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers—USSR, United States, and Great Britain. Selected Documents], Moscow, 1978, pp 126-127.

7. I.V. Stalin, "Speech at 19th Party Congress."

8. Ibid., p 7.

9. I.V. Stalin, "Conversation with PRAVDA Correspondent," Moscow, 1952, p 13.

10. "Transcript of Comrade I.V. Stalin's Conversation with U.S. Republican Party Leader Harold Stassen on 9 April 1947," Moscow, 1947, pp 16, 18.

11. I.V. Stalin, "Conversation with PRAVDA Correspondent," p 10.

12. Ibid.

13. I. Kravtsov, "Agressiya amerikanskogo imperializma v Koreye" [American Imperialism's Aggression in Korea], Moscow, 1951, p 3.

14. Ibid., p 438.

15. "Documents on American Foreign Relations," Princeton, 1951, p 4f.

16. G. Paige, "The Korean Decision," New York, 1968, p 269.

17. "Containment," New York, 1978, pp 412, 398.

18. "Documents on American Foreign Relations," p 4f.

19. Ibid., p 7.

20. "Containment," pp 210-211. Unfortunately, no Soviet materials of this kind can be cited; everything

pertaining to military planning in those years is still unavailable to the researcher.

21. "Documents on American Foreign Relations," p 4f.

22. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Op. cit.*, p 37.

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Notes for a History of the 'Cold War'

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[Article by Viktor Levonovich Israelyan, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and consulting professor at Diplomatic Academy]

[Text] World War II was coming to an end. The rough outlines of the postwar structure of the world could already be seen, and the symptoms of its "leftward shift" and signs of the increasing popularity and authority of the Soviet Union were evident. The dynamics of world politics and the very course of the war were clearly demonstrating the futility of the hopes of the extreme right wing in London and Washington for the exhaustion of the Soviet Union. The plans to establish an Anglo-American diumvirate in the postwar world, in which the United States and England would be the "two policemen" responsible for maintaining law and order, also seemed unrealistic. The plans for the creation of various artificial structures (federations and other groupings of states) in Europe and Asia, which were so reminiscent of the West's policy of the "cordon sanitaire" against the Soviet Union, did not seem realistic either.

Instigators of the "Cold War"

In summer and fall 1944, Churchill was so upset by the successes of the Soviet Armed Forces that he felt the need to convene the "big three" without delay. He hoped to reach decisions with Roosevelt that would be acceptable to England and the United States on the future of the East European countries. The meeting did not take place, however, and mainly because of the presidential election in the United States. "Roosevelt certainly could not take a long trip at the height of the political campaign, but Churchill took an invulnerable position by asserting that the advancing Russian armies would not wait for the election returns to come in from Michigan, South Dakota, and Oregon," American author R. Sherwood reported in a sarcastic tone.¹ In line with this, the English prime minister went to Moscow in October 1944 in a vain attempt to keep events in Eastern Europe from taking an undesirable turn for the English and Americans.

In fall 1944 American representatives in Moscow—Ambassador A. Harriman and General J. Dean, the head of the military mission—also expressed worries about the rapid westward advance of the Soviet troops. Dean, for example, strongly recommended the revision of the

entire lend-lease policy in September 1944 because of the improvement in the military position of the USSR. In their reports to Washington, they tried to convince the American leadership that as the Soviet Government grew more assured of the ability of its forces to win the war without the help of the Allies, it would begin pursuing "its own egotistical policies." This led to the unequivocal conclusion that the United States would have to display a "more concerned and stronger interest in events in Central Europe than before, and, if necessary, respond to Soviet contempt for our ideals with contempt for their ideals."²

On 6 April 1945 Harriman sent Washington an analytical survey of Soviet foreign policy and his own recommendations on the new U.S. policy line in relation with the USSR. He repeated that one of the main objectives of Moscow's foreign policy was the "penetration of other countries by undermining democratic processes with the help of local communist parties and by exploiting their economic difficulties."

To counteract this, the ambassador recommended a new type of Soviet-American relationship, namely a relationship in which the United States would make concessions only to the degree that the Soviet Union would be willing to do the same, and in which the United States would "take a position presenting difficulties for the Soviet rulers if they should take a position presenting difficulties for us, and hurt them if they hurt us."³

Therefore, American experts on Soviet-American relations believed that the changes in the international situation by the end of the war would require a hard line linking the prospects for future collaboration with the USSR's willingness to make concessions in key areas of world politics.

Churchill expressed his views even more frankly, if not more cynically, in spring 1945. "First of all," he sums them up in his memoirs, "Soviet Russia has become a lethal threat to the free world; second, a new front has to be opened immediately to stop its rapid advance; third, the front in Europe should stretch as far as possible to the east; fourth, Berlin is the principal and true goal of the Anglo-American armies; fifth, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of Prague by American troops are more important; sixth, Vienna and, in essence, all of Austria must be governed by the Western powers, at least on an equal basis with the Russian Soviets; seventh, Marshal Tito's aggressive claims to Italy must be curbed. Finally—and this is the most important thing—East-West agreement on all of the main issues pertaining to Europe must be reached before the armies of the democracies leave or the Western allies give up any part of the German territory they conquered, or, as writers might soon describe it, liberated from totalitarian tyranny."⁴

Roosevelt had a fairly reserved reaction to Churchill's belligerent appeals and, in a conversation shortly before his death, he said, half in jest, that the British intended to

drag the United States into a war with Russia. When the new president took office after Roosevelt's death and Churchill learned of Truman's determination to take a "hard line" in relations with the Soviet Union, the premier's joy knew no bounds. He announced that future relations with the USSR could "be based on the Russians' recognition of Anglo-American strength."³

The abrupt change in the Allies' attitude toward the USSR became evident in spring 1945. There were hotheads in Washington and London who actually believed that the United States and England could be at war with the Soviet Union that year. The completion of the work on the atomic bomb project in the United States, in their opinion, offered a unique opportunity for this. Nevertheless, they decided not to risk this kind of war, partly because it would not have been supported by the American and English public. Viewing the Soviet Union as the main obstacle in the way of the United States' claims to world hegemony, Washington decided to fuel a "cold war" against the USSR. Within the framework of this policy line, priority was assigned to efforts to discredit the Soviet Union, change its ally image into an enemy image, and frighten the world public with the "Soviet threat."

Inappropriate Reactions to the "Cold War"

The successful completion of this unseemly task depended largely on Soviet foreign policy. When the Soviet State was challenged, were our reactions always appropriate? Did our actions, including those within the country, provide excuses to stir up anti-Soviet hysteria? The answers to these questions will supplement the common assumptions about the origins of the "cold war."

Let us recall the difficulties of the first postwar years. After the Soviet Union had ended the war with a victory over fascism, it entered a new stage in its development. The fascist invaders left terrible devastation in their wake. Many cities and rural communities lay in ruins. The war-ravaged economy was restored quickly, primarily through self-reliance.

The return to a peaceful life and the disclosure of boundless scope for constructive activity, however, were accompanied by the first signs of the old authoritarian methods of governing the country, abuses of power, and violations of legality. The "debates" on philosophy, biology, physiology, linguistics, and political economy and the decrees on the journals ZVEZDA and LENIN-GRAD, the movie "A Great Life," and others seriously injured Soviet science, literature, and art and also had extremely negative international repercussions. The campaign against "signs of a lack of principles," "cosmopolitanism," and the "idolatry of foreign things" was essentially directed against the establishment and development of artistic and commercial contacts with foreign countries. Several world-renowned Soviet scientists—in genetics, biology, physics, mathematics, and cybernetics—had to stop their research. Some of them were repressed.

The fear of being accused of every mortal sin, including involvement in espionage and "contacts with foreigners," reawakened the Soviet people's memories of the dismal days of the struggle against the "enemies of the people" in the 1930's. The real possibility of a repetition of these days was attested to by the fabricated "Lenin-grad plot," resulting in the liquidation of prominent Soviet government and party leaders, the "doctors' plot," leading to the repression of a large group of prominent Soviet physicians, and the brutal treatment (arrest and exile) of the people the Nazis had deported to Germany. The Stalinist aberrations were an absolute godsend to the organizers of campaigns against the USSR and socialist ideals.

It is no coincidence that when President Truman addressed Congress in March 1947 to validate his notorious doctrine of assisting Turkey and Greece in the event of "communist aggression," he launched into a tirade about the communist way of life, "based on the brutal imposition of the will of the minority on the majority." He did not fail to mention the atmosphere of terror and lawlessness, the strict censorship in the press, the sham elections, the violations of personal freedoms, etc.

Stalin's feelings about the people who had been taken prisoner during the war years are no secret. He viewed them as traitors and began taking repressive actions against them after they had returned to their native land. News of this quickly crossed the borders of the Soviet Union. The appropriate Western agencies did their best to talk former prisoners-of-war out of returning to the USSR. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were so worried about their own future and the future of their friends and relatives that they preferred to be numbered among the missing, refused to go back home, and settled in the West. Most of them had no place to live and no job, and they had to ask for assistance. Taking advantage of the pitiful state of these people, the Western governments used them in various kinds of anti-Soviet activity (intelligence, propaganda, the creation of military groups, etc.).

To finance this activity, the Mutual Security Act was passed in the United States on 10 October 1951, envisaging special allocations in the amount of 100 million dollars. In particular, the law allocated large sums for acts of sabotage and subversive activity by individuals and armed groups in the Soviet Union and several other states. When the Soviet Union brought up the issue of "aggressive actions and intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of other countries" at the sixth session of the General Assembly in 1951 and demanded that these actions be censured, the American delegation tried to justify the law with the reluctance of the emigres to return to the Soviet Union and with the flagrant violations of the basic freedoms in our country. Predictably, the rhetorical battles which broke out over this issue at the General Assembly session did not produce any positive results and simply escalated international tension.

In the first postwar years we repeatedly declared our intention and determination to continue pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence as the basis for relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries. This was done, for example, in Stalin's conversations with A. Worth, E. Roosevelt, and H. Stassen in 1946 and 1947, which dealt mainly with Soviet-American and Soviet-English relations. The Soviet leadership also agreed with the need to convene meetings of the "big three." In particular, a TASS news release of 20 May 1948 on Soviet-American relations said: "As we know, the most difficult international issues were resolved in Roosevelt's time by representatives of the United States, USSR and Great Britain in total agreement and unanimity for more than 3 years. Why do they now feel it would be impossible to agree on solutions to new and less difficult problems? Is it because the current administration in the United States has departed from Roosevelt's policy and is pursuing another policy?"⁶

Furthermore, although we declared our adherence to the ideals of peace and international cooperation, for a long time we believed that the basis of all future developments in international relations would be an uncompromising struggle between two hostile camps—socialist and capitalist. The very concept of "two camps," which was added to the political lexicon by us, did much to prepare us for confrontation and rivalry rather than cooperation. What is more, Soviet leaders regularly stressed in their speeches that the relations between the two camps were "deteriorating," that conflicts were "mounting," etc.

Acting in accordance with the primitive idea that "anyone who is not with us is against us," we sometimes expanded the "imperialist camp" to include various liberal and bourgeois-pacifist organizations and virtually the entire world social-democratic movement, including the French Socialists, headed by "capitalism's inveterate apologist" Blum,⁷ the German Social Democrats, and the English Labour Party, regardless of whether these parties were in power or in the opposition. As for the rightwing socialists, they were described as nothing other than "vile agents of imperialism," "accomplices of the warmongers," and "traitors to the national interest, camouflaging their vile actions with socialist phrases and cosmopolitan verbiage."⁸

The dogmatic and biased interpretations of complex and varied processes in international life in the first postwar years inflicted considerable damage on the foreign policy of the USSR. Reports by Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Suslov, and other officials on international issues (in the postwar period Stalin made almost no general statements on this subject matter) followed the same stereotypical pattern. When they analyzed the state of affairs in the "imperialist camp," they said that it was being torn apart by "irreconcilable differences" and was always on the verge of severe internal upheavals which would, at best, turn Western Europe into an "American protectorate" or the "49th American state," or might even turn

the West European people into cannon fodder in an American imperialist war against the "socialist camp."

The situation in the "anti-imperialist democratic camp," on the other hand, was always portrayed in rosy hues, whether it was the situation with regard to the social and economic development of the Soviet Union or relations between socialist countries. They asserted, for example, that our country, in the pursuit of its peaceful policy, was "completely in accord with the other democratic peaceful states."⁹

Besides this, it was precisely in the first postwar years that serious negative features first became apparent in the Soviet Union's relations with socialist countries. The Soviet Union's experience in developing its own national economy was passed off as the standard for other states embarking on the road of socialist development. It was assumed that the principal and decisive condition of economic recovery would be the use of the internal forces and resources of any country and the establishment of its own industry. The slogan of the accelerated buildup of heavy industry was carried over to other countries without any consideration for local conditions. As subsequent events demonstrated, this did nothing at all to promote the economic prosperity of the socialist countries.

Stalin constantly violated one of V.I. Lenin's most basic precepts, the belief that "only tremendous concern for the interests of different nationalities will eliminate the causes of conflict, eradicate mutual suspicion, erase the fear of any kind of intrigue, and create the kind of trust, especially among workers and peasants speaking different languages, without which peaceful relations between nationalities and any degree of success in the development of everything of value in contemporary civilization would be absolutely impossible."¹⁰

The distorted nature of these violations was revealed at the end of the 1940's in the Soviet Union's relations with Yugoslavia. After winning a glorious victory over the fascists in close cooperation and alliance with the USSR, the Yugoslav Communists decided to build a new society with a view to the historical, economic, and other distinctive features of their own country. This was completely inconsistent with the stereotypical thinking of that time, and instead of patiently continuing the discussion of the matters on which there were differences of opinion, Stalin broke off the relationship, and Yugoslavia's relations with all of the socialist countries were then aggravated to the extreme under pressure from Stalin. Incredibly insulting labels were then pinned on the Yugoslav political and state leadership of that time!

In the other East European countries which had chosen the path of socialist development, leading officials of the communist and workers parties were prosecuted in a series of political trials that bore a striking resemblance to the trials of the "enemies of the people" in the Soviet Union in the 1930's. Later these officials were usually acquitted, some of them posthumously.

The mistakes and distortions in relations between socialist countries as a result of the cult of personality and the departure from Lenin's principles of the equality of all nationalities benefited the foreign policy strategy of the United States and its allies, which was aimed at discrediting socialism as a political system, undermining the Soviet Union's cooperation with other socialist countries, and exacerbating nationalist conflicts. All of them became part of the "enemy image" the advocates of "cold war" were building so zealously.

Was the "Marshall Plan" Really That Bad?

The "Marshall Plan" occupies a special place in the history of postwar Europe and of international relations in general. At first it seemed to have no connection with the overtly anti-Soviet political maneuvers the West was undertaking within the framework of its declared "hard line." Even the speech Secretary of State G. Marshall presented at Harvard University in 1947 sounded tame in comparison with the many belligerent statements like Churchill's Fulton speech. Marshall proposed American aid to Europe to "assist in restoring normal economic conditions in the world."¹¹ He resolutely denied that his proposal was directed against any specific country. Obviously, Marshall's speech and his plan were not indicative of changes in U.S. policy. Volumes of scientific and unscientific works have been written about the real and imaginary purposes of the Marshall Plan. The author of the plan probably never even dreamed of some of his purported aims. It does appear, however, that the Marshall Plan was an integral part of the postwar U.S. political strategy of isolating the Soviet Union, complicating its economic recovery, undermining socioeconomic reforms in the countries of popular democracy, and weakening the influence of communist and workers parties.

Nevertheless, the plan did differ in one significant respect from other Western diplomatic moves. The creation of the bizon and trizon¹² in West Germany and then the West German State and the establishment of the North Atlantic alliance and various international organs of military, political, and economic collaboration between the United States and the West European states were clearly intended to isolate the USSR and other socialist countries. The Marshall Plan was different. It was a chance to become involved in the "recovery program" of all European countries. Furthermore, with Washington's consent, the governments of England and France invited the Soviet Union to a joint discussion of Marshall's proposals, as a result of which the foreign ministers of the USSR, England, and France met for a conference in summer 1947. In this way, the Marshall Plan formally provided a chance to return to the wartime policy of cooperation.

This was probably a forced move. Proposing a plan for the restoration of Europe and excluding the Soviet Union, which had suffered more than any other country in the war, would have revealed the underlying political motives of the proposal and would have jeopardized the

plan from the very beginning. Under these conditions, the proposal of assistance in the economic recovery of all Europe was a calculated risk. It is true that Zhdanov asserted in a speech at an information conference of some communist parties in Poland in 1947 that the risk was minimal because it was well known in advance (?) that the USSR would refuse to discuss the American aid proposals on the terms Marshall had set.¹³

The definition of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Marshall Plan was of exceptional importance to the future development of international relations. People in Moscow knew this. At first, in summer 1947, it might even have seemed that the possibility of Soviet participation in the American program could not be excluded. This was attested to by the consent to discuss this plan at the conference of the foreign ministers of the three powers in Paris and by some of Molotov's remarks at the conference.

When the conference in Paris came to an end on 2 July, however, Molotov announced that the USSR would not participate in the American program of aid to Europe. The reason he cited was that the procedures proposed by France and supported by England for the implementation of the Marshall Plan envisaged the creation of an all-Europe organization to make the final decisions on the extension of American credits to particular countries. The underlying theme of Molotov's entire speech was the idea that "the decisive factor in the European countries should be the internal measures and national efforts in each country, and not the expectation of foreign support."¹⁴

The Soviet Union's refusal to take part in the Marshall Plan was followed by a massive propaganda campaign. It was called nothing other than an American plan for the enslavement of Europe, a plan directed "against the elementary rights of labor in the European countries, against a higher standard of living for the European masses," and against the bases of their independence and autonomy, a plan to "ruin national industry in the Marshallized countries" and to turn them into "obedient mercenaries and satellites of the United States," and so forth and so on.¹⁵ There was also no shortage of predictions, and these painted the most dismal prospects. There was the assertion, for example, that the Marshall Plan would lead unavoidably to a "new escalation of conflicts and intensification of struggle between members of the imperialist camp," that it would accelerate and intensify the economic crisis "which is seizing more and more of the capitalist economy of Europe and America," that it envisaged the "demotion of England and France to second-rate powers," and that it would cause the "deformed development of the West German economy." At a conference of the Information Bureau of the communist parties in Hungary in 1949, Suslov hastened to inform the world that the economies of the West European countries were "in a state of complete chaos instead of recovery" almost 2 years after the start of the Marshall Plan.¹⁶ This categorical assertion was

followed by an equally peremptory announcement that the Marshall Plan was a failure.

Let us attempt an appraisal of the effectiveness of our decision to boycott the Marshall Plan. First we will have to decide what results the so-called American program of European recovery and development had on the political level. The Marshall Plan, as the fourth edition of the Diplomatic Dictionary correctly observes, marked the beginning of the postwar political and economic split of Europe, the creation of a politico-military bloc of Western countries—NATO—under U.S. auspices, capable of intensifying the "cold war" against the socialist countries, and the increasing dependence of many West European states on the United States.¹⁷

In light of this appraisal, which is objective on the whole and which says nothing about the "devastating conflicts," "deep-seated crisis," or "total chaos" in the economies of the capitalist countries, we must admit that Soviet diplomacy was unable to use its non-participation to undermine the U.S. political strategy aimed at isolating the Soviet Union.

The weakening of contacts and exacerbation of relations between the East and West were obviously inconsistent with the Soviet Union's declared policy line of peaceful coexistence. The speed with which Soviet diplomacy refused to participate in the Marshall Plan and then condemned it at every turn arouses confusion at the very least. After all, the foreign aid law regulating the implementation of the Marshall Plan was not passed by the American Congress until April 1948—i.e., 9 months after the plan was announced—and envisaged the offer of aid on the basis of bilateral agreements. The opportunity the American program of recovery and development offered Europe for the commencement of unbiased dialogue for the purpose of finding mutually acceptable conditions for the implementation of the program was virtually ignored.

"Ugly Words" and Their Results

The exposure of the plans of American imperialism and its allies was assigned an exceptionally important place in Soviet foreign policy in the first postwar years. "It is essential...that each statement by the propagandists of a new war," Stalin stressed in March 1946, "receive the rebuff it warrants from the public and the press, so that the warmongers can be exposed before they have time to misuse freedom of speech against the interests of peace."¹⁸ Appeals for the exposure of everything and everyone were voiced in countless speeches by Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, and Suslov. Vyshinskiy was particularly zealous. His imagination knew no bounds when it came to the choice of scathing but essentially meaningless labels. He insulted not only the negotiators but also the states they represented. Such epithets as "rabid warmonger," "flagrant liar," "lunatic," "madman," "half-crazed idiot," "vile slanderer," and "satellite" or "puppet" of American imperialism were heard quite often in his speeches.

A discerning and thorough analysis of the political opponent's views and proposals, the disclosure of their weak points, underlying motives, and aims, and the objective and scientific calculation of the possible consequences of the acceptance of a specific proposal are the most important methods of diplomacy. They can aid in preventing or at least complicating the attainment of an opponent's goals if they conflict with international security interests and will hurt other states, and they can assist in the choice of a more effective position. In this sense, the exposure of imperialism's anti-Soviet and antisocialist plans was and is an important function of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy, but when it turns into empty rhetoric accompanied by outright verbal abuse, it is always counterproductive. Is it possible that the "ruthless exposure" of the policies of ruling circles in Western countries and their leaders contributed to their political isolation? Let us take a look at the facts. The "warmonger" label we pinned on W. Churchill and J.F. Dulles, who were not occupying any official executive positions at the end of the 1940's, did not keep the first from regaining the office of prime minister of England in 1951 or the second from becoming U.S. secretary of state in 1952.

We must admit that the weakness for "ugly words," which V.I. Lenin repeatedly described as something exceptionally harmful to diplomacy, was accompanied in Soviet foreign policy practice by various careless and ineffective moves or the mere slamming of doors. Remember, for example, how the Soviet representative walked out of a meeting of the UN Security Council in the first half of 1950 to protest the participation of representatives of the Kuomintang regime instead of the PRC in its work, and thereby allowed the United States to cover the Korean venture with the UN flag.

Within a short time, Soviet representatives also walked out of the UN Economic and Social Council and its commissions and subcommissions, the UN Commission on Conventional Arms, the Trusteeship Council, the International Children's Fund, the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies, and many other international forums. The Soviet representatives had to return soon afterward.

Bilateral or multilateral treaties on friendship and alliance are known to represent the highest level of cooperation between states. During World War II the USSR concluded several international agreements of this kind with England, Czechoslovakia, France, Yugoslavia, and Poland. During the years of "cold war," however, the Soviet Union initiated the denunciation of the 1945 treaty on friendship, mutual assistance and postwar collaboration with Yugoslavia (in 1949), the 1942 treaty on alliance in the war against Hitler's Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war with England (in 1955), and the 1944 treaty on alliance and mutual assistance with France (in 1955), which consolidated the division of Europe, intensified the confrontation between the "two camps," and compounded the USSR's isolation.

In the first postwar years the Soviet Union put forth foreign policy initiatives on current issues in world politics, but some of them included conditions that were clearly unacceptable to the other side and excluded the possibility of reaching an agreement from the very beginning. Taking advantage of these conditions, our political opponents had little trouble rejecting the Soviet proposals as a whole and asserting that they had been made exclusively for propaganda purposes.

Our proposals on arms reduction and disarmament also had little chance of widespread approval. The main reason was probably our position on verification, which essentially precluded effective measures. Our spymania and the struggle against so-called cosmopolitanism and against the idolatry of foreign things naturally affected our attitudes toward international verification, especially a form of verification as important as on-site inspections.

In the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust, proposals on disarmament issues which are not reinforced with precise provisions assuring all parties to the agreement that it will be observed, signify either that we are living in a world of illusion or that we want to capitalize on the naivete and gullibility of our partners. The latter, seeing that our society was once again seized by total suspicion and that many scientific, cultural, and other contacts with foreign countries were being broken off ruthlessly and thoughtlessly, understandably had no wish to take on commitments in the security sphere without obtaining the necessary guarantees. It is hard to trust a regime which does not trust its own people—this is an iron-clad rule of international relations.

There is also another rule: When we analyze a particular action in the international arena, we must take the entire situation strictly into account, including the state of affairs within the country and in the world at the specific time when the action was taken. We cannot analyze matters in the abstract and disregard the real state of affairs. All of this is true, but it seems to me that the decisive factor in the analysis of any foreign policy action is its productivity—in other words, the degree to which it aided in enhancing the international prestige of the Soviet Union and expanding its foreign ties.

If we look at international relations in the first postwar years from this standpoint, we must admit that although the Soviet Union declared its intention to pursue a policy of "international cooperation and the development of commercial ties with all countries," subsequent events led to confrontation, and some of our actions which separated us from the rest of the socialist camp, the abrogation of ally agreements, and the campaigns for exposure and denigration and some others added grist to the mill of the advocates of "cold war." Along with other manifestations of the cult of personality, they helped to create the "enemy image." Gallup polls of the late 1940's and early 1950's indicated that most Americans were certain that they would be at war with the USSR soon. The psychological atmosphere for the establishment of NATO and the further consolidation of Western politico-military collaboration had been created.

Of course, it is difficult to imagine how the postwar world might have looked if the "cold war" could have been prevented. One thing, however, is absolutely clear: The parties involved, including the Soviet Union, did not make use of every opportunity to prevent its outbreak.

Footnotes

1. R. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History," vol II, Moscow, 1958, pp 540-541.
 2. H. Feis, "Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought," London, 1957, p 436.
 3. Ibid., p 597.
 4. W. Churchill, "The Second World War. Triumph and Tragedy," Boston, 1953, vol VI, pp 456-457.
 5. Ibid., pp 491, 492.
 6. IZVESTIYA, 20 May 1948.
 7. A.A. Zhdanov, "O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii" [The International Situation], Simferopol, 1947, p 19.
 8. "Soveshchaniye Informatsionnogo byuro kommunisticheskikh partiy v Vengrii" [Conference of the Information Buro of the Communist Parties in Hungary], Moscow, 1949, p 60.
 9. G. Malenkov, "Report to 19th Party Congress on Work of All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee," Moscow, 1952, p 49.
 10. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 240.
 11. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1947 god" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. 1947], ch II, Moscow, 1952, p 117.
 12. Literally "two zones" and "three zones." The American and English (and later the French) name for the occupied zones in Germany after their separate unification—Ed.
 13. A.A. Zhdanov, Op. cit., p 22.
 14. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz," p 123.
 15. "Amerikanskiy plan zakabaleniya Yevropy" [American Plan for the Enslavement of Europe], Moscow, 1949, pp 14, 21.
 16. "Soveshchaniye Informatsionnogo byuro kommunisticheskikh partiy v Vengrii," p 35.
 17. "Diplomatiicheskiy slovar" [Diplomatic Dictionary], vol II, Moscow, 1985, p 185.
 18. IZVESTIYA, 23 March 1946.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

U.S.-Pakistan: New Phase of Interrelations

904K0001E Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 17 Aug 89) pp 66-70

[Article by M.V. Braterskiy]

[Text] An important event in American-Pakistani relations took place at the beginning of June—Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the United States. By that time, judging by all indications, the American and Pakistani administrations had finished a preliminary analysis of foreign policy issues and essentially had mapped out a policy line in bilateral relations and a policy on the Afghan problem. At a joint session of both congressional houses, B. Bhutto said: "Today we are standing on the threshold of a new democratic partnership between our countries, with a view to the new priorities and requirements of security and socioeconomic needs, a partnership which will continue into the 21st century with strong mutual trust and similar or common interests, a partnership in keeping with our common values, developing in association with democratic governments in different countries in defense of the values of liberty."

This seems to indicate the start of a qualitatively new period in American-Pakistani relations.

The critical state of the Pakistani society and economy, which gave rise to the need to establish a civilian government supported by the general public, will require the resolution of acute ethnic, political, and economic problems. This, in turn, will be inseparable from the stabilization of the situation in Southwest Asia, the resolution of the Afghan refugee problem, and the development of the civilian Pakistani economy.

The Americans have always been able to get along with the Pakistani military establishment, although public opinion in the United States has not always been in favor of supporting a military dictatorship. Today this irritant is gone, and Washington is readily arranging for cooperation with the civilian government on a broader scale. As events in recent months have shown, however, the civilian government in Pakistan has been unable to refuse the assistance of the military establishment to date, because only the military has any real experience in controlling the turbulent Pakistani society and has the strength to counteract tendencies toward disintegration and social upheaval in the country. Nevertheless, the changes in the balance of political power have affected the army: General Mirza Aslam Begh, the new chief of army staff in Pakistan, said that after the election the army should "return to the barracks" and concentrate on military preparations for the defense of Pakistan's foreign borders. Many observers feel that this position is supported by the high command and that the army is willing to support the government in all matters. Nevertheless, there are signs of civilian control over military

activity: The prime minister dismissed Lt Gen G. Hamid from the influential office of chief of Pakistan's inter-agency intelligence administration and replaced him with General S.R. Khallu, who is thought to be more receptive to her way of thinking. Just half a year ago, this move would have seemed unthinkable.

Besides this, the army's stance on foreign policy issues is changing. When General M.A. Begh addressed the command and staff personnel in Quetta on 26 October 1988, he said he felt it was time to stop relying solely on the United States and to secure a balance of power in South and Southwest Asia by forging closer relationships with such countries as Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.

The ideas of striking a balance between the military and civilian elements of American-Pakistani relations and of strengthening Pakistan's security by means of broader cooperation with neighboring Islamic countries are deeply rooted in the country's civilian political elite.

The chairman of the authoritative Pakistani Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, believes, for example, that it is in the national interest for Pakistan to correct its overly pro-American posture, improve relations with the USSR, participate in the regional integration of the Islamic countries, and establish relations of peace and cooperation with Afghanistan. Ideas of this kind are more likely than before to be considered in government decisionmaking.

Therefore, the United States is dealing with a civilian government supported by the army, and this has had an indisputable effect on the nature of American-Pakistani relations.

Another distinctive feature of the new phase of American-Pakistani relations is that B. Bhutto, judging by her campaign statements and actions, assigns priority to domestic affairs. Her Pakistan People's Party has declared its intention to make Pakistan a "modern developed state." This is to be achieved by the development of Western-style capitalism, and this will make American economic aid and private investment extremely necessary. This is one of the points in American-Pakistani relations at which Pakistan's present role in the Afghan conflict is connected with its relationship with the United States. In an APN interview, Benazir Bhutto frankly said: "We appreciate the colossal economic assistance Pakistan receives from the United States. We are simply worried that this interest might vanish when the Afghan question has been settled.... We do not want it to disappear because we need help in our economic development. Our dream is a dream of economic growth and modernization." What is this? The hope of normalizing the situation on the Pakistani-Afghan border and simultaneously retaining U.S. support?

The desire to secure economic growth and stability is apparently motivating Pakistan to lay down the economic and political burdens connected with the presence

of Afghan refugees in the country and with the undeclared war against Afghanistan. The revision of American-Pakistani policy on Afghanistan, however, has been a slow and arduous process.

The Geneva agreements signed on 14 April 1988 on Afghanistan engendered the hope of the settlement of the conflict in Southwest Asia. The agreements were supposed to help resolve the Afghan conflict and establish the necessary external conditions for internal regulation in Afghanistan.

Not all of the hopes the agreements aroused were justified, however. When the USSR and the Government of Afghanistan began the unconditional fulfillment of the agreements, the Reagan administration and the Government of Pakistan, then headed by General Zia-ul-Haq, used the agreements as an excuse for broader interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and for attempts to overthrow the regime in Kabul by military force and establish a pro-Pakistani government there.

When Pakistan signed the Geneva agreements, it pledged not to allow its territory to be used in any way for the violation of the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of Afghanistan or the subversion of its political, economic, and social stability. Besides this, Pakistan pledged not to allow the presence on its territory, to shelter in its camps and bases, to organize, to train, to finance, or to arm and equip individuals or groups for the purpose of conducting subversive activity and creating unrest in Afghanistan.

In violation of these agreements, Pakistan continued to arm and train the mujahedin, sent its own military advisers to work with their groups, and allowed the creation of a self-styled "transitional government" of Afghanistan within its territory.

The Reagan administration, which had pledged to guarantee the observance of the Geneva agreements, did not show any desire to take steps toward their fulfillment either. On the contrary, the United States continued shipping the weapons Pakistan was turning over to the "recalcitrant" groups and continued to give Pakistan diplomatic support. The United States did not stop the direct support of the armed opposition in Afghanistan either.

The result was a deadlock, a situation in which the inertia of U.S. policy, and especially of Pakistani policy, precluded the resolution of the conflict.

Why do I feel that this was a case of political inertia? Everyone knows that the current Pakistani line in relations with Afghanistan was personally initiated by Zia-ul-Haq and supported by his military leaders. Zia-ul-Haq died, and the Pakistani Army decided to give up control of the country to a civilian government with broad popular support because it had become obvious that only this could solve the problems Pakistan was facing. Since the middle of August 1988 there had been a sort of

vacuum in domestic politics in Pakistan: There was no one to make important foreign policy decisions, and local officials were simply toeing the old line.

Something similar was also going on in the United States. The election campaign was the focus of political attention, and the outgoing administration was not inclined to change anything in its stance on the events in Afghanistan.

The new administrations in the United States and Pakistan were also affected by this inertia. The reluctance to change the old line was reinforced by the hope that the regime in Kabul would collapse soon. As Selig Harrison from the Carnegie Endowment commented, "at first the administration assumed that a quick and easy mujahedin victory was possible, and that therefore we had no need for a new policy." The military defeats of the opposition and the unsuccessful assault on Jalalabad, however, forced the United States and Pakistan to reconsider their stance on the settlement in Afghanistan.

In addition, we must not forget that the interests of the two countries are not completely identical in the Afghan conflict. When the United States supplied the Afghan armed opposition with money and weapons, first covertly and then overtly, the supply channels it used were part of the infrastructure created by the Pakistani special services. As a result, the American aid was actually distributed by Pakistan, which took advantage of the situation to support and strengthen the originally comparatively small fundamentalist groups. Zia-ul-Haq had greater hopes for the extremist Islamic forces because he expected them to set up a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. The United States, however, would probably have preferred to aid opposition forces ideologically more distant from Iran.

As long as the highest priority in American policy in the region was the struggle against the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Washington closed its eyes to Pakistan's manipulation of its military aid. Now that the Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the country, however, there is increasing anxiety in the United States over the possibility that American aid will fall into the hands of the "recalcitrants," who are anti-Western in general and anti-American in particular. There are signs that a new understanding of the nature of the Afghan conflict and the means of resolving it is gradually making headway in the Congress and the administration. It is interesting that Chairman A. Beilenson of the Select House Committee on Intelligence said that the United States should stop supplying the partisans with weapons. "The offer of military assistance to the Afghan rebels is not in our interest now that the Soviets have withdrawn their troops," he wrote in a NEW YORK TIMES article. More members of Congress are realizing that current U.S. policy in Afghanistan is ineffective and that there is no foreseeable military solution to the problem.

Judging by the results of B. Elutto's talks with G. Bush, the Pakistani prime minister is also aware of the need to

revise policy toward Afghanistan. During the June visit, only the first step was taken in this direction: The sides displayed considerable interest in the possibility of a political settlement and acknowledged the need to consult the USSR on this matter. They also announced, however, that they would continue offering military assistance to the armed opposition and would support the so-called transitional government that was formed in Peshawar. The demand that the government in Kabul give up its power was not withdrawn either. The United States and Pakistan are willing to stop their military assistance only "on the condition of an acceptable political settlement"—i.e., on the condition that the transitional government take charge of the organization of elections there and the formation of a new Government of Afghanistan.

Of course, this stance reveals no consideration for the real state of affairs, and it is probable that the bloodshed in Afghanistan will continue for some time before the United States and Pakistan realize the need to change this stance.

A change in the U.S. and Pakistani stance on the settlement in Afghanistan seems quite realistic, however, because Washington no longer has any serious interest in intervention. The settlement of conflicts on the Afghan-Pakistani border is also becoming increasingly necessary to Islamabad, which hopes to solve its urgent domestic problems.

Another factor inhibiting the expansion of U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation is the overall situation in the region and in Pakistan's relations with India.

The relations between the two large Asian countries have always been tense. Pakistan calls India's policy in the region hegemonic, and India sees Pakistan's military preparations as a threat to its own security. The fierce territorial dispute over Kashmir has not been settled. The Pakistani leadership has reaffirmed its old position on the Kashmir problem and, according to Indian and Pakistani analysts, although relations between India and democratic Pakistan might improve slightly (the recent contacts between R. Gandhi and B. Bhutto attest to this), their complete normalization will be impossible unless the Kashmir question is resolved.

The situation in the region is being exacerbated even more by the Pakistani nuclear program. The decision to build the "Islamic bomb" was made by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and it is still not clear whether his daughter intends to give up the dangerous legacy. The arms race on the subcontinent is continuing in this atmosphere. Pakistani military construction is based on American assistance. For the last 10 years the Pakistani military leaders have used the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as an excuse to demand ever larger military shipments from the United States and to use them to make Pakistan stronger than India.

What will happen now? Even the Pakistani Army has recently stopped talking about the "threat from the

north." Now that the Soviet troops have been withdrawn, neither the American public nor the world community can be told that "foreign occupation" has made shipments of weapons to the opposition necessary. The American military aid to Pakistan is complicating U.S. relations with India. There has been progress in U.S. relations with this South Asian power in recent years, and it would like to consolidate this progress, but the results of Bhutto's visit indicated that the United States still regards Pakistan's demands for the reinforcement of its security as legitimate, at least to some extent, and will not break its promise to offer Pakistan large packages of military-economic aid. During the visit, for example, an agreement was signed on the delivery of 60 F-16 planes to Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the Pakistani nuclear program is a sore spot in American-Pakistani relations. For a short time the United States tried to guarantee vigorous Pakistani action against Soviet troops and the Afghan Government by excluding Pakistan from the countries prohibited by American law from receiving military assistance because they are carrying out a nuclear program. There was only one reason for this exclusion—the United States' desire to exert as much pressure as possible on the Government of Afghanistan and to "punish" the USSR for sending its troops to the country. Now the Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, and Pakistan is no longer a "frontline state" even from the American vantage point, so the United States has no more excuses to disregard Pakistan's nuclear program.

In fact, this issue was one of the main topics of discussion at the American-Pakistani meeting in June. Benazir Bhutto calmed the Americans by assuring them that Pakistan "does not have a nuclear device and does not intend to build one." President Bush responded by asking Islamabad to cease striving for the "unilateral" acquisition of this device.

It appears that the U.S. position on this matter is firm and that American-Pakistani relations in the future can develop only on a non-nuclear basis. The problem also takes in the issue of Pakistan's civilian nuclear program, however, and a compromise was reached on this program: Washington withdrew its earlier demand that Pakistan not exceed the 5-percent limit in uranium concentration. Bhutto promised that Pakistan would not try to reach the concentration level needed for military technology—90 percent. It is true, as CIA spokesmen said, that the range between 5 percent and 90 percent is an "unknown quantity."

In general, it seems clear that American-Pakistani relations have entered a new phase. Priority has been assigned to the expansion of economic ties, the reinforcement of stability in South Asia, and the support of Pakistan's young democracy. This reordering of priorities in the relations between the two countries in favor of development and democratic, humanitarian values would benefit the United States and Pakistan and would

be in the interest of Pakistan's neighbors because it would strengthen peace and security in the region.

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